John Pierce AO

With or without you: the evolution of Australia’s energy market

07 May 2015

Speech by Chairman John Pierce at Energy Network Association Forum 'Energy Transformed' 2015

With or without you: the evolution of Australia’s energy market

7 May 2015

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I’d like to start by acknowledging the traditional owners of the land on which we meet and pay my respects to their elders, both past and present.

Can I also thank John Bradley, CEO of the Energy Networks Association for inviting me to speak with you today.

Can I also acknowledge:

  • Rosemary Sinclair, CEO of newly founded Energy Consumers Australia;
  • Michelle Groves, CEO of the Australian Energy Regulator;
  • CEOs of industry here today – too many to mention individually which reflects very well on the organisation of this event.

We are now three years through a market-wide energy reform program – Power of Choice – which at its heart is about facilitating the development of a more resilient, responsive market for energy services.

One that can develop and adjust to whatever the future brings, in terms of factors such as: demand patterns and levels; consumer preferences and expectations for value added services, and reliability and quality of supply; changes in technology, such as in metering, load control, electric vehicles, distributed generation and storage; and the relative input prices of capital, labour and fuel sources.

2 One where price levels, structures and risk allocation from the consumer through to energy source – which are the links that tie the different elements of the service supply chain together, that impact on the long term interests of consumers and influence their behaviour – are consistent with one and other.

One that enables and rewards the sector for making a positive contribution to the economy’s long term growth potential via innovation and productivity growth.

It is important to keep in mind that structural adjustments implied by the sort of factors referred to above, far from being exceptional events, are the normal pattern underpinning economic growth. In fact it is an illusion to pursue the long term interest of consumers and at the same time pretend to keep the structure of our system of production and the businesses that make it up, stationary.

Of course the rule changes flowing from the Power of Choice review won’t, by themselves, lead to a resilient, responsive energy services market.

All of our market development reviews, advice to the COAG Council for Energy and rule change processes need to be aligned to this strategic intent.

Nor of course is the AEMC’s remit the sole influence on how the market evolves and its ability to respond to these drivers of structural adjustment in a manner consistent with the National Electricity Objective.

How you as individual businesses decide to respond, the strategies you pursue and priorities you set are obviously a critical determining factor. The title you have given to today’s discussions reveals you are well aware of this.

On a broader level you have probably heard me say before that the outcomes experienced by consumers – the ability of the market to meet this objective – is a function of three variables.

At this point I should apologise for my somewhat mathematical bent – I recently pointed out to a learner driver how overtaking involved using the calculus he was learning at school. I’m not sure that he found that particularly helpful.

But in this case the three variables impacting on consumers are:

  1. what is happening in the competitive generation and retail sectors,
  2. what is happening in the regulated network sector; and
  3. the means by which – the tools and instruments – that governments choose to intervene in the market in order to achieve their quite legitimate policy objectives in areas such as vulnerable consumers, emission levels and land use planning, which are usually developed outside of energy portfolios.

Government objectives in these areas are of course a given, however what we can and should do is point out how to design policy instruments that achieve these objectives that are also compatible with how the energy market operates.

But back to Power of Choice - these are important reforms.

And much of the heavy lifting involved in the Power of Choice reform program addresses issues with regulation of electricity networks – how distribution network prices are structured and the competitive framework for metering and metering services for example.

The latter being an example of how technology can open up opportunities for consumers, rather than regulators, to decide for themselves what services are of value to them, and in the process re-define what parts of the supply chain sit within the competitive as against the regulated sectors.

So I want to thank you all – including the Energy Networks Association – for helping us lay the foundations for lasting energy market reform for the road ahead.

In any challenging reform program it is worth reminding ourselves from time to time why we started down this path in the first place.

It is true that efficient markets are characterised by effective participation of both the supply and demand sides of the equation.

And clearly that is something the Commission, industry, consumer groups and governments have an interest in encouraging.

But the Power of Choice report was really a response to changes in the key drivers of how the sector develops that was started once the decision was made to establish the NEM as part of the overall Competition Policy reform package.

When I, and I suspect many of you, started working in this sector the main driver was the generation sector. That’s where all the action was. With the establishment of the NEM, and retail competition, that focus shifted to the retail sector and now – with or without us – the key driver of development is the consumer.

So how do the ‘bits’ of the Power of Choice reform fit together?

Connected, well thought through reform, often gets unpacked during implementation into its constituent parts and scattered to the point where you need an Allen key and Ikea instructions to get it back together.

The Power of Choice reforms are designed to fit together.

They will deliver better outcomes for consumers and set us up for long-term market efficiency and stability, but only if we stay the course on the key aspects of the reform package.

We can’t pick and choose the bits we like and bits we don’t without compromising the move to a consumer driven energy market, where consumer choice is what drives the way the market evolves.

The first piece of the puzzle is getting effective price signals to the consumer. That’s where the distribution network pricing rule change comes in – which will come into effect from 1 July 2017.

From that date, network prices will better reflect the cost of providing network services to individual consumers.

Even if the total costs and revenues of network services are at efficient levels, retailers and consumers cannot be expected to make efficient choices unless these revenues are recovered via price structures that better reflect the cost consequences for networks of their individual decisions.

This will allow consumers to make more informed choices – to see and access value in those choices – and that gives them a reason to participate in the market.

All energy ministers indicated their full support for the network pricing reforms in the most recent COAG Energy Council meeting in December last year:

“The Council supports tariff reform as an essential next step in this process as a means of providing better price signals to consumers and notes that new Distribution Network Pricing Arrangements will enable distribution businesses to set prices that reflect the efficient costs of providing network services to each consumer. This will allow consumers to make informed decisions about their electricity usage and help to deliver better signals for efficient investment in distribution network capacity.” - COAG Energy Council, December Communique

But it’s no good consumers having a reason to participate, if you don’t have the means to participate.

And to participate consumers need information and they need tools. Clearly competition in retail markets plays an important role here, as does government in supporting information campaigns.

So the second piece of the puzzle is improved consumer access to information about their energy consumption via a rule change that went through in November.

It allowed customers to obtain their electricity consumption data from their distributor as well as their retailer.

It allows other parties authorised by customers to request access to electricity consumption data from retailers and distributors.

And it provides minimum requirements for the format, time frames and costs involved when a customer requests their consumption data.

As well as information, consumers need tools, and that’s where the third piece of the puzzle - metering reform – is important.

And the metering work is really a ‘set-of-reforms’ – rule changes – which provide the necessary conditions for a competitive energy services market to develop.

These include a rule change to promote competition in metering and related services; an open access and common communication standards framework for smart meters; and arrangements to allow multiple trading relationships at the consumer’s connection point.

The competition in metering rule change really is the “key” to unlocking the full value and benefit of consumer participation in energy markets.

Like a mobile phone or a pay TV box, advanced meters are currently an important piece of the physical infrastructure that enables consumers to use a service they value.

It is a tool that can help consumers monitor, manage and adjust their electricity consumption and, importantly, capture the value of doing so, if they so choose. Opening up the metering space to competition will allow consumers to benefit from a wider range of energy services and demand-side products.

Tools to respond to time-of-use pricing, off-peak charging of electric vehicles, faster retailer switching and more efficient notification of system faults to network operators.

Our draft determination, as most of you will be aware, is out there for public consultation and we had a good discussion at the public forum here in Sydney last week.

The draft determination makes it clear we intend a market led approach, meaning investment in metering services will be driven by consumers choosing products and services they value at a price they are willing to pay.

Again, this is a reform which has been endorsed by energy ministers at the December COAG Energy Council meeting:

“The Council supports the push for competitive market-led rollouts of smart meters and the delivery of tangible benefits to consumers from new metering technology.” - COAG Energy Council, December Communique

The metering reforms mean investment, innovation and technological development will be responding to consumer preferences, rather than a regulator’s preferences.

Meters, of course, are not the only tool consumers need for competition to thrive.

Consumers also need tools to help them shop around for the best deal. Just as importantly, they need to know about the tools available to them.

And while there are useful comparison sites available to consumers, our research, including that conducted for our annual Retail Competition Review, clearly shows that most consumers don’t know about them.

Our last survey found that only 1 per cent of consumers could identify their jurisdiction’s independent comparison website unprompted. That went up to 29 per cent in Victoria when prompted (lower in other states) but that is still a very low number.

That’s why we’ve recommended a range of initiatives to increase consumer awareness of the choices available to them.

These included improvements to comparison websites and tools, targeted information campaigns to consumers with difficulty accessing online information such as those who do not speak English, and a mass market media campaign.

Giving consumers the tools, information and clear price signals, means consumer choice is what will drive market development for energy and energy related services.

This is a direction consumers were already headed in – with or without us – propelled by technological change.

The different parts of the Power of Choice reform program will work together to support that change. But we must stay the course on all aspects of the reform program, because they are very much integrated reforms which rely on each other to succeed.

Metering is not the only technological issue the AEMC is looking at which has the potential to reshape the energy market landscape.

In collaboration with the CSIRO, we’ve also started a new project looking at the regulatory implications of storage technology.

Advances in technology and decreasing costs mean storage technologies have the potential to affect every part of the electricity supply chain.

Distributed storage systems may offer significant benefits to consumers with intermittent energy sources, such as the 1.4 million Australian households with rooftop solar PV, by allowing them to better match their generation to their usage needs.

Large-scale storage systems may be used by network businesses to reduce congestion, smooth network peaks, mitigate outages or provide network support in remote areas – all of which potentially reduce the need for spending on network infrastructure, thereby reducing the cost of network services for consumers.

Storage systems connected to power stations could allow generators to better manage variations in wholesale prices between times of high and low demand, or better integrate variable generation resources like large-scale wind.

So we are looking at how different storage technologies may be utilised across the electricity supply chain; the implications for electricity consumption; and how the legislative and regulatory framework may need to respond.

The project is a little new, so we haven’t outlined the details of stakeholder engagement on this project, but that will happen in the coming months and I’m sure many of you will be interested in that.

Now, some would ask the question: does this mean you’re expecting storage technology to mature in the short term?

We don’t take a view on that. For us, the work we’re doing: looking at metering technologies, storage technologies and the regulatory implications of technology and market change in general is about understanding what is on the horizon so that the regulatory framework is flexible and resilient enough to respond to change, whatever comes.

We don’t know what types of technology are going to emerge in the future.

What we do know is that consumers will dictate that, by doing what consumers do in a workably competitive market.

The consumer driven transformation of energy markets will move ahead with us or without us.

Government, regulators and retailers, generators and networks alike have to make choices about whether they’ll embrace the evolution of the market.

Our view is that it is better to be ahead of change than behind it – regulators have found out the hard way what it means to be unprepared.

It’s now up to networks to respond to this evolution and to the new regulatory arrangements. The way you have structured your discussions today is evidence that has already happened.

Again, I want to thank you all – including the ENA – for coming with us on this path.

It is not an easy journey – and I dare say there’ll continue to be a fruitful and robust exchange of ideas.

But no structural change happens easily; and good, lasting reform only happens when there is that free and frank exchange of ideas via robust consultation and engagement.

I look forward to continuing that engagement with all of you.

And thank you again to the Energy Networks Association for inviting me to speak today.

ENDS

Energy market development at a crossroads

10 November 2014

COMMENTS BY CHAIRMAN JOHN PIERCE AT THE BUSINESS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA’S FORUM: AUSTRALIA’S ENERGY ADVANTAGES

Energy market development at a crossroads

10 November 2014

With declining growth in demand in the electricity sector, the National Electricity Market faces new challenges to promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use of, electricity services for the long term interest of consumers. At the same time, the Governments and market operators in Western Australia are considering the appropriate design of their energy markets in the context of challenges, partly caused by the use of a ‘capacity market’ model. The following comments by John Pierce at the BCA’s forum to launch their paper – Australia’s Energy Advantages – follow his recent speech titled ‘A consumer driven market’ made at the 2014 NEM Future Forum.

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Check against delivery The price and reliability outcomes we experience in the electricity sector are a function of three things: what’s happening in the competitive generation and retail sectors, what’s happening in the regulated network sector and policy decisions, often from environment or land use planning portfolios that have a significant impact on how the market operates.

It can get complicated at times when there is an issue to diagnose, which of these three areas is its source. It can be even harder to get them all to move in a consistent direction, which raises interesting institutional design and accountability questions.

But it seems to me we are at an intersection, or a crossroads, in terms of energy market development, where depending on the decisions we make collectively – government, market institutions, industry and consumer groups – we will end up going down one of two paths.

The first path is one where the future development of the sector – the major investment decisions and disinvestment decisions – is effectively made by government.

This is essentially where we were before we had a National Electricity Market.

It is where the UK is now – private sector investment does not occur unless it is underpinned by a regulation, a government contract, or some other form of subsidy from the government.

Of course, this calls into question whether you’ve actually got a market at all if major investment decisions only happen if the government is there to direct and support them.

And a key characteristic of that sort of outcome is that the risks associated with investment and disinvestment decisions and the risks with whether such things as your demand projections are accurate, effectively land at the feet of consumers.

The alternative path, again depending on how we respond to issues facing the sector, is that we continue to develop a market which is essentially being driven by:

  • Consumers doing what consumers do – making consumption decisions;
  • Where investment risk and demand risk are managed by businesses operating in a workably competitive market;
  • Where the networks sector operates within a regulatory framework that people can have confidence in and where there is a closer relationship between the prices charged for network services for individual consumers and the efficient cost of providing those services (Read about new rules proposed for distribution cost-reflective pricing); and
  • Where the investments used to achieve government’s policy objectives are compatible with the way the energy market works and where risk allocation is consistent with what makes our market ‘a market’ in the first place.

The decisions and responses to the issues we face will either take us inexorably down one path, or the other.

ENDS

A consumer driven market

19 September 2014

SPEECH BY COMMISSIONER JOHN PIERCE AT 2014 NEM FUTURE FORUM

A consumer driven market: the next chapter in a national productivity improvement story

19 September 2014

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Thank you for being here today to discuss the future of the National Electricity Market.

Before we begin, I’d like to acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which we meet and pay my respects to their elders both past and present. I’d also like to acknowledge:

  • Keith Orchison, our Chair today, and
  • All our other speakers.

I’ve been asked to speak about where the national energy market is now, and where it’s headed in the future.

As a Commission, we are in a sense quite agnostic about the future. We are not in the business of making forecasts of demand, prices, relative costs and technologies.

In performing our role, we don’t need to, because ultimately it will be consumers doing what consumers do – making consumption decisions based on the price and service options available to them – that will drive the way the sector develops.

But where we are now?

The National Electricity Market has been on a fairly consistent reform path over the past 25 years or so.

I don’t intend to give a history lesson today, but briefly: the reform of the energy sector was part of a major period of economic reform kicked off in the 80s, which included reforming a set of capital intensive utility services such as energy, communications, transport and water, whose performance was not supporting long term economic growth to the extent that it could.

These assets were state owned, centrally organised and monopolistic.

Since then, the story in our sector has been one of separating policy and regulatory functions from industry; industry restructuring; and bringing competition to the sector.

A key characteristic of the old industry structure – and one that makes what we have today in the competitive generation and retail sectors different – is where demand and investment risks fall and the way they are managed.

It is in fact how these risks are allocated between consumers and businesses that determines whether ‘what we have’ deserves to be called a market at all.

Numerous reports and reviews dating back to the 1986 McDonell and 1988 Curran inquiries in NSW, through to the Western Australian Economic Regulatory Authorities’ report on that State’s wholesale electricity market published last year, show that wherever you have a central authority determining how the sector is to develop – how much investment is to occur – how much capacity is to be built or procured based on fallible forecasts of the future – the costs of getting these decisions wrong rests with consumers.

For the future of the sector to be driven by consumers deciding what is of value to them, one of the prerequisites is that demand and investment risks are managed by businesses, operating in a workably competitive market.

You don’t need to believe – though you may choose to – that people making investment decisions based on forecasts of the future working within an AGL or Origin or Alinta, are any better at foretelling the future than people – possibly the same people – working within a central authority. The point is the risk allocation, the way it’s managed and the associated incentives are different.

We have come a long way but there is, of course, work to be done.

We have clearly commenced a new stage where the NEM’s development is driven by consumers making choices about the way they source and use energy.

The measures set out in the Commission’s Power of Choice reform package, and the reviews of retail competition, which included proposals to address the way distribution tariffs are structured that are now at the Draft Rule stage, are about facilitating consumers move from the “back seat” to the “driver’s seat” – giving them better information and tools to make informed choices about their energy consumption.

A key question though is will they find it a comfortable seat and a pleasant experience?

Consumers – that is, people – need to be as comfortable making choices about energy as they are picking items off the supermarket shelf.

When you think about the process of choosing products at a supermarket, a consumer is able to scan a shelf, run their eye past the Tim Tams, the Iced Vovos, the Mint Slices (a personal favourite), the Scotch Fingers, and all the while weighing up taste, quality, price, your attempt to be virtuous with respect to diet. And pretty quickly narrowing it down to a couple of options – the Iced Vovos and the Mint Slices – and buy both.

Granted energy is a little more complicated than that, but fundamentally we want to get to a place where consumers are as comfortable making decisions about energy as they are other products and services, where competition and choice is taken for granted.

And to do that people need information; they need tools; they need to be engaged; they need a reason to be engaged; and they need the price they pay for energy to reflect the cost of supplying them, as individuals.

Together, the AEMC’s Power of Choice reforms and the lessons from our reviews of retail competition are key to achieving these objectives.

One of the Power of Choice building blocks is the distribution network pricing rule change, which aims to have network prices paid by individual consumers better reflect the cost of providing network services to them.

Currently, even if the total costs of network services is at efficient levels, many individual consumers pay more than the costs caused by their usage, because of the way network prices are structured. Other consumers, in particular those that use a greater proportion of their energy at peak times, pay less than the costs caused by their usage.

Existing network price structures over-recover for off-peak use of the network and under-recover for peak use. In the draft rule determination, we include a number of case studies to explain this.

By way of example a consumer using an average size north facing solar PV system will save themselves about $200 a year in network charges compared with a similar consumer without solar.

Because most of the solar energy is generated at non-peak times, it reduces the network’s costs by $80, leaving other consumers to make up the $120 shortfall through higher charges.

The same consumer could reduce network costs considerably and align with the savings they receive, by facing their panels west, generating more energy 4 at peak times when it is most needed. That is, less energy in total, but more when it is most valued.

Under the existing network pricing arrangements, the consumer has no incentive to do so as they benefit more by generating more total energy throughout the day.

Equally, a consumer using a large 5kW air-conditioner in peak times will cause about $1,000 a year in additional network costs compared with a similar consumer without an air-conditioner.

But the consumer with the air-conditioner pays about an extra $300 under the most common network prices. The remaining $700 is recovered from all other consumers through higher network charges.

In both examples, some consumers are paying more than it costs to provide services to them, and others less.

The objective of the changes set out in our recent Draft Determination is that network prices paid by individual consumers better reflect the cost of providing network services to them, as individuals.

This will allow consumers to make more informed choices about what energy services they value.

It will also give consumers the information they need to decide what technologies might work best for them to manage their usage, and help reduce their energy charges.

From a market and overall system point of view, it will mean consumers' choices are the driving force behind market development and investment and provide the conditions for a more effective and competitive energy market.

Of course it’s one thing to create the market conditions for choice, but consumers also need the tools to respond to market price signals.

Another important Power of Choice building block is creating opportunities for a competitive energy services market.

It goes without saying that consumers use of technology will be a huge part of the process in driving change and market development in coming years.

We don’t necessarily know which technologies or how they will be used, which is precisely why the Commission’s policy work is agnostic about technological development, but we know they will drive innovation and change and the system must be flexible enough to respond to that change.

The rule change to promote competition in metering and related services; the open access and common communications standards framework for smart meters; arrangements to allow multiple trading relationships at the consumer’s connection point; and measures to improve the switching process – these reforms will all work together to help the energy services market evolve in a way that supports consumer choice.

So how might we predict the future for the National Energy Market?

My advice is to follow the consumer.

They’re in the driving seat and technology is propelling them very quickly in relatively unpredictable ways.

Increasingly, they’re expecting engagement. Not only to be consulted on industry and regulatory activity but to actively participate in the energy market.

So in terms of how the Australian Energy Market Commission sees the energy market of the future, we don’t plan to bet on any single possible future.

Instead, we want a system which is flexible enough to respond to the increasingly sophisticated and diverse demands of consumers, which allows their choices and preferences to drive market development.

But, we won’t get there if we start fiddling with the way energy is bought and sold (the means of exchange) or if there are policy interventions in the market that undermine its operation and the ability of price to reflect underlying demand and supply conditions.

So let’s talk about capacity (so called) “markets”.

There has been increased chatter in recent times suggesting that there may be a case for a fundamental redesign of the wholesale energy market – a move to a capacity (so called) “market”.

This, at least in part, appears to be motivated by the current disconnect between wholesale and retail prices and generation oversupply.

The WA energy market is a good local example of the problem with capacity markets and the WA Government is currently grappling with what to do about the problems they cause – predominantly higher risk and generally higher prices for consumers.

The WEM is typical of other capacity markets in that it relies on a central authority to predict and procure generation capacity.

If your system requires an omnipresent, all knowing being – let’s call him or her ‘god’ – to understand a system completely, have perfect powers of prediction and to know what capacity should be set to match future demand, the only thing you can perfectly predict is that god will be wrong.

In reality, typically in capacity markets our omnipresent, perfect bureaucrat will contract or regulate for too much supply, because that is the rational thing to do given the incentives god faces.

And when he or she gets it wrong and over contracts, the consumer pays.

That is certainly the case in WA. It was the case in the “olden days” of the state-based utilities. The consequence of this type of structure is that demand risks fall on consumers.

We’ve well and truly moved away from this era in the NEM – indeed as I’ve spent most of today’s speech talking about, we are headed in exactly the opposite direction.

So the message to those intending to fiddle with the development of a consumer driven energy market and revert to the risk allocation of the old days is a simple one – you are heading in the wrong direction.

Part of the underlying issue here of course, is the impact of bringing together the way the energy market works with the particular way the Renewable Energy Target is designed.

In effect, because the RET sets a specific GWh target, its risk allocation is the same as a capacity (so called) “market”.

These issues of the interface between the two have always been there, but have only become more evident with the drop off in demand growth.

Governments legitimately have a range of policy objectives in addition to the traditional energy policy objectives.

That’s why we have elected governments to specify policy objectives. But in achieving these different objectives we must be careful, wherever possible, not to jeopardise the achievement of one to the benefit of another.

When contemplating the effective integration of energy and environmental policy, it is important to design a mechanism to achieve an emissions reduction objective that preserves the means of exchange and allocation of risk in energy markets. Because these are the characteristics that make the energy market, a “market” in the first place.

For the NEM to be an effective market, it must be able to respond to changes in demand driven by consumer preferences, changes in technology and other factors, like relative prices, which cannot necessarily be predicted.

For a policy to be sustainable there needs to be a reasonable opportunity to adapt to material changes in market conditions, in a consistent manner.

Robust policy positions should not be predicated on one particular view of the future.

For environmental policy like the RET to be sustainable, investors also need a level of confidence that policy objectives can be met and are sufficiently robust to adjust to changes in market conditions.

It is due to the divergence in the risk allocation mechanisms in the energy market on the one hand, and the current RET design on the other, that we proposed, in our submission to the RET review, moving the RET to a floating 20 per cent target in 2020, as opposed to a fixed GWh target.

The important point is not even the level at which the target is set – let’s call the target “X” – it’s that it is “X per cent” of whatever demand happens to be.

This would shift the allocation of demand risk away from consumers and more appropriately share it amongst investors – renewable and thermal – who are better placed to manage such risk and profit from efficient decisions.

While consumers are going to drive much of the change we experience in the energy market in the coming years through their demands and preferences, we also have to make sure the benefits flow to all consumers.

And we must ensure some consumers don’t get lost in the change and the increasing diversification of the sector. This involves a massive communications challenge.

In May this year, the Commission held its first strategic priorities forum with consumer representatives in order to deepen our relationships with consumers and their advocates as we consider the agenda ahead of us.

Consumer engagement was right at the top of the list of issues we are dealing with, particularly ensuring they having full information about contracts, offers and changes related to new flexible pricing structures.

Equally significant to consumer groups was the impact of energy prices, along with the importance of consumer protections, particularly those that support more vulnerable and low income consumers.

So we need to be able to respond to those concerns about ensuring all consumers benefit from greater competition, and respond to concerns about the necessary consumer protections needed into the future.

Many consumers need the information and confidence to become more engaged in shopping for energy. Our Consumer Engagement Blueprint for the review of competition in NSW energy retail markets recommended strategies to achieve this, including:

  • providing information to consumers that uses different channels to target specific consumer segments as well as the broader community,
  • refinements to existing comparison tools so that consumers have a trusted source of advice that allows ‘apples for apples’ comparisons, many of which are already being considered by the AER, and
  • providing additional support to consumers that need it.

And many of these reforms are being rolled out with some good results.

For example, it was encouraging to see in our recent report on competition in retail electricity and gas markets that 90 per cent of all consumers were aware they could choose their energy company, up to 40 per cent had actively investigated options, and up to 28 per cent had actually switched during 2013.

Consumers are shopping around for better gas and electricity deals more often than they are switching insurance companies, or phone and internet providers.

New retailers are entering markets and winning customers with discounts and other incentives, with conservative estimates of savings from $60 to $240 or more a year, depending on where they live and how much electricity they use.

The other aspect of the communications challenge is to understand that there are an increasing number of already engaged consumers – energy literate consumers – who want an entirely different energy product compared with what has been provided to them in the past.

So as we embrace the challenge of responding to diverse needs – from highly energy literate consumers, to more traditional consumers, to vulnerable consumers – it will be important to have a market that is flexible and able to respond to diversity and range of possible future scenarios.

In the years to come, the structure of the energy sector may be quite different to the one we see today.

The increased interest of new technology providers in our sector has the potential to reshape the way we think of an energy services provider.

The increased use of electric cars, the uptake of home energy management systems and technologies, and other possible demand game changers, which may work in completely opposite directions.

All this has the potential to change the face of the energy sector.

The focus of the AEMC – the agnostic AEMC – is to care deeply about the future and develop the NEM into a market that is flexible and able to respond to whatever the future holds.

Thank you for listening and enjoy what promises to be a fascinating day’s discussion.

ENDS

A consumer driven market

19 September 2014

SPEECH BY COMMISSIONER JOHN PIERCE AT 2014 NEM FUTURE FORUM

A consumer driven market: the next chapter in a national productivity improvement story

19 September 2014

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Thank you for being here today to discuss the future of the National Electricity Market.

Before we begin, I’d like to acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which we meet and pay my respects to their elders both past and present. I’d also like to acknowledge:

  • Keith Orchison, our Chair today, and
  • All our other speakers.

I’ve been asked to speak about where the national energy market is now, and where it’s headed in the future.

As a Commission, we are in a sense quite agnostic about the future. We are not in the business of making forecasts of demand, prices, relative costs and technologies.

In performing our role, we don’t need to, because ultimately it will be consumers doing what consumers do – making consumption decisions based on the price and service options available to them – that will drive the way the sector develops.

But where we are now?

The National Electricity Market has been on a fairly consistent reform path over the past 25 years or so.

I don’t intend to give a history lesson today, but briefly: the reform of the energy sector was part of a major period of economic reform kicked off in the 80s, which included reforming a set of capital intensive utility services such as energy, communications, transport and water, whose performance was not supporting long term economic growth to the extent that it could.

These assets were state owned, centrally organised and monopolistic.

Since then, the story in our sector has been one of separating policy and regulatory functions from industry; industry restructuring; and bringing competition to the sector.

A key characteristic of the old industry structure – and one that makes what we have today in the competitive generation and retail sectors different – is where demand and investment risks fall and the way they are managed.

It is in fact how these risks are allocated between consumers and businesses that determines whether ‘what we have’ deserves to be called a market at all.

Numerous reports and reviews dating back to the 1986 McDonell and 1988 Curran inquiries in NSW, through to the Western Australian Economic Regulatory Authorities’ report on that State’s wholesale electricity market published last year, show that wherever you have a central authority determining how the sector is to develop – how much investment is to occur – how much capacity is to be built or procured based on fallible forecasts of the future – the costs of getting these decisions wrong rests with consumers.

For the future of the sector to be driven by consumers deciding what is of value to them, one of the prerequisites is that demand and investment risks are managed by businesses, operating in a workably competitive market.

You don’t need to believe – though you may choose to – that people making investment decisions based on forecasts of the future working within an AGL or Origin or Alinta, are any better at foretelling the future than people – possibly the same people – working within a central authority. The point is the risk allocation, the way it’s managed and the associated incentives are different.

We have come a long way but there is, of course, work to be done.

We have clearly commenced a new stage where the NEM’s development is driven by consumers making choices about the way they source and use energy.

The measures set out in the Commission’s Power of Choice reform package, and the reviews of retail competition, which included proposals to address the way distribution tariffs are structured that are now at the Draft Rule stage, are about facilitating consumers move from the “back seat” to the “driver’s seat” – giving them better information and tools to make informed choices about their energy consumption.

A key question though is will they find it a comfortable seat and a pleasant experience?

Consumers – that is, people – need to be as comfortable making choices about energy as they are picking items off the supermarket shelf.

When you think about the process of choosing products at a supermarket, a consumer is able to scan a shelf, run their eye past the Tim Tams, the Iced Vovos, the Mint Slices (a personal favourite), the Scotch Fingers, and all the while weighing up taste, quality, price, your attempt to be virtuous with respect to diet. And pretty quickly narrowing it down to a couple of options – the Iced Vovos and the Mint Slices – and buy both.

Granted energy is a little more complicated than that, but fundamentally we want to get to a place where consumers are as comfortable making decisions about energy as they are other products and services, where competition and choice is taken for granted.

And to do that people need information; they need tools; they need to be engaged; they need a reason to be engaged; and they need the price they pay for energy to reflect the cost of supplying them, as individuals.

Together, the AEMC’s Power of Choice reforms and the lessons from our reviews of retail competition are key to achieving these objectives.

One of the Power of Choice building blocks is the distribution network pricing rule change, which aims to have network prices paid by individual consumers better reflect the cost of providing network services to them.

Currently, even if the total costs of network services is at efficient levels, many individual consumers pay more than the costs caused by their usage, because of the way network prices are structured. Other consumers, in particular those that use a greater proportion of their energy at peak times, pay less than the costs caused by their usage.

Existing network price structures over-recover for off-peak use of the network and under-recover for peak use. In the draft rule determination, we include a number of case studies to explain this.

By way of example a consumer using an average size north facing solar PV system will save themselves about $200 a year in network charges compared with a similar consumer without solar.

Because most of the solar energy is generated at non-peak times, it reduces the network’s costs by $80, leaving other consumers to make up the $120 shortfall through higher charges.

The same consumer could reduce network costs considerably and align with the savings they receive, by facing their panels west, generating more energy 4 at peak times when it is most needed. That is, less energy in total, but more when it is most valued.

Under the existing network pricing arrangements, the consumer has no incentive to do so as they benefit more by generating more total energy throughout the day.

Equally, a consumer using a large 5kW air-conditioner in peak times will cause about $1,000 a year in additional network costs compared with a similar consumer without an air-conditioner.

But the consumer with the air-conditioner pays about an extra $300 under the most common network prices. The remaining $700 is recovered from all other consumers through higher network charges.

In both examples, some consumers are paying more than it costs to provide services to them, and others less.

The objective of the changes set out in our recent Draft Determination is that network prices paid by individual consumers better reflect the cost of providing network services to them, as individuals.

This will allow consumers to make more informed choices about what energy services they value.

It will also give consumers the information they need to decide what technologies might work best for them to manage their usage, and help reduce their energy charges.

From a market and overall system point of view, it will mean consumers' choices are the driving force behind market development and investment and provide the conditions for a more effective and competitive energy market.

Of course it’s one thing to create the market conditions for choice, but consumers also need the tools to respond to market price signals.

Another important Power of Choice building block is creating opportunities for a competitive energy services market.

It goes without saying that consumers use of technology will be a huge part of the process in driving change and market development in coming years.

We don’t necessarily know which technologies or how they will be used, which is precisely why the Commission’s policy work is agnostic about technological development, but we know they will drive innovation and change and the system must be flexible enough to respond to that change.

The rule change to promote competition in metering and related services; the open access and common communications standards framework for smart meters; arrangements to allow multiple trading relationships at the consumer’s connection point; and measures to improve the switching process – these reforms will all work together to help the energy services market evolve in a way that supports consumer choice.

So how might we predict the future for the National Energy Market?

My advice is to follow the consumer.

They’re in the driving seat and technology is propelling them very quickly in relatively unpredictable ways.

Increasingly, they’re expecting engagement. Not only to be consulted on industry and regulatory activity but to actively participate in the energy market.

So in terms of how the Australian Energy Market Commission sees the energy market of the future, we don’t plan to bet on any single possible future.

Instead, we want a system which is flexible enough to respond to the increasingly sophisticated and diverse demands of consumers, which allows their choices and preferences to drive market development.

But, we won’t get there if we start fiddling with the way energy is bought and sold (the means of exchange) or if there are policy interventions in the market that undermine its operation and the ability of price to reflect underlying demand and supply conditions.

So let’s talk about capacity (so called) “markets”.

There has been increased chatter in recent times suggesting that there may be a case for a fundamental redesign of the wholesale energy market – a move to a capacity (so called) “market”.

This, at least in part, appears to be motivated by the current disconnect between wholesale and retail prices and generation oversupply.

The WA energy market is a good local example of the problem with capacity markets and the WA Government is currently grappling with what to do about the problems they cause – predominantly higher risk and generally higher prices for consumers.

The WEM is typical of other capacity markets in that it relies on a central authority to predict and procure generation capacity.

If your system requires an omnipresent, all knowing being – let’s call him or her ‘god’ – to understand a system completely, have perfect powers of prediction and to know what capacity should be set to match future demand, the only thing you can perfectly predict is that god will be wrong.

In reality, typically in capacity markets our omnipresent, perfect bureaucrat will contract or regulate for too much supply, because that is the rational thing to do given the incentives god faces.

And when he or she gets it wrong and over contracts, the consumer pays.

That is certainly the case in WA. It was the case in the “olden days” of the state-based utilities. The consequence of this type of structure is that demand risks fall on consumers.

We’ve well and truly moved away from this era in the NEM – indeed as I’ve spent most of today’s speech talking about, we are headed in exactly the opposite direction.

So the message to those intending to fiddle with the development of a consumer driven energy market and revert to the risk allocation of the old days is a simple one – you are heading in the wrong direction.

Part of the underlying issue here of course, is the impact of bringing together the way the energy market works with the particular way the Renewable Energy Target is designed.

In effect, because the RET sets a specific GWh target, its risk allocation is the same as a capacity (so called) “market”.

These issues of the interface between the two have always been there, but have only become more evident with the drop off in demand growth.

Governments legitimately have a range of policy objectives in addition to the traditional energy policy objectives.

That’s why we have elected governments to specify policy objectives. But in achieving these different objectives we must be careful, wherever possible, not to jeopardise the achievement of one to the benefit of another.

When contemplating the effective integration of energy and environmental policy, it is important to design a mechanism to achieve an emissions reduction objective that preserves the means of exchange and allocation of risk in energy markets. Because these are the characteristics that make the energy market, a “market” in the first place.

For the NEM to be an effective market, it must be able to respond to changes in demand driven by consumer preferences, changes in technology and other factors, like relative prices, which cannot necessarily be predicted.

For a policy to be sustainable there needs to be a reasonable opportunity to adapt to material changes in market conditions, in a consistent manner.

Robust policy positions should not be predicated on one particular view of the future.

For environmental policy like the RET to be sustainable, investors also need a level of confidence that policy objectives can be met and are sufficiently robust to adjust to changes in market conditions.

It is due to the divergence in the risk allocation mechanisms in the energy market on the one hand, and the current RET design on the other, that we proposed, in our submission to the RET review, moving the RET to a floating 20 per cent target in 2020, as opposed to a fixed GWh target.

The important point is not even the level at which the target is set – let’s call the target “X” – it’s that it is “X per cent” of whatever demand happens to be.

This would shift the allocation of demand risk away from consumers and more appropriately share it amongst investors – renewable and thermal – who are better placed to manage such risk and profit from efficient decisions.

While consumers are going to drive much of the change we experience in the energy market in the coming years through their demands and preferences, we also have to make sure the benefits flow to all consumers.

And we must ensure some consumers don’t get lost in the change and the increasing diversification of the sector. This involves a massive communications challenge.

In May this year, the Commission held its first strategic priorities forum with consumer representatives in order to deepen our relationships with consumers and their advocates as we consider the agenda ahead of us.

Consumer engagement was right at the top of the list of issues we are dealing with, particularly ensuring they having full information about contracts, offers and changes related to new flexible pricing structures.

Equally significant to consumer groups was the impact of energy prices, along with the importance of consumer protections, particularly those that support more vulnerable and low income consumers.

So we need to be able to respond to those concerns about ensuring all consumers benefit from greater competition, and respond to concerns about the necessary consumer protections needed into the future.

Many consumers need the information and confidence to become more engaged in shopping for energy. Our Consumer Engagement Blueprint for the review of competition in NSW energy retail markets recommended strategies to achieve this, including:

  • providing information to consumers that uses different channels to target specific consumer segments as well as the broader community,
  • refinements to existing comparison tools so that consumers have a trusted source of advice that allows ‘apples for apples’ comparisons, many of which are already being considered by the AER, and
  • providing additional support to consumers that need it.

And many of these reforms are being rolled out with some good results.

For example, it was encouraging to see in our recent report on competition in retail electricity and gas markets that 90 per cent of all consumers were aware they could choose their energy company, up to 40 per cent had actively investigated options, and up to 28 per cent had actually switched during 2013.

Consumers are shopping around for better gas and electricity deals more often than they are switching insurance companies, or phone and internet providers.

New retailers are entering markets and winning customers with discounts and other incentives, with conservative estimates of savings from $60 to $240 or more a year, depending on where they live and how much electricity they use.

The other aspect of the communications challenge is to understand that there are an increasing number of already engaged consumers – energy literate consumers – who want an entirely different energy product compared with what has been provided to them in the past.

So as we embrace the challenge of responding to diverse needs – from highly energy literate consumers, to more traditional consumers, to vulnerable consumers – it will be important to have a market that is flexible and able to respond to diversity and range of possible future scenarios.

In the years to come, the structure of the energy sector may be quite different to the one we see today.

The increased interest of new technology providers in our sector has the potential to reshape the way we think of an energy services provider.

The increased use of electric cars, the uptake of home energy management systems and technologies, and other possible demand game changers, which may work in completely opposite directions.

All this has the potential to change the face of the energy sector.

The focus of the AEMC – the agnostic AEMC – is to care deeply about the future and develop the NEM into a market that is flexible and able to respond to whatever the future holds.

Thank you for listening and enjoy what promises to be a fascinating day’s discussion.

ENDS

The environment for successful infrastructure reform

07 August 2014

ACCC Conference Speech “The Environment for successful Infrastructure Reform: The NEM as a case study”

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Introduction

Thank you for inviting me to speak with you this morning. The last time an AEMC Chair spoke at an ACCC Conference was 7 years ago and he used to work with you so I feel particularly privileged.

The organisers asked me to not be distracted by the references to economic literature in the conference blurb for this session but to focus on my own experiences particularly in relation to the National Electricity Market. So a large element of what I will share with you are personal experiences from which I draw some hopefully useful lessons.

One is actually embodied in the session’s blurb. It describes I think two separate streams in the literature – the first being that which describes what is trying to be achieved – “the bright ideas of economists and other thinkers” – which does make a significant contribution to getting reform done successfully.

The second which describes or gives a framework for the processes of reform does not. However insightful these observations are of what’s going on I don’t think they are particularly helpful when trying to implement reform.

Fundamentally we have two – not necessarily mutually exclusive options – we can either use economics to describe what’s going on in reform processes or to help define the outcomes we are trying to achieve. Both are legitimate choices but in choosing the former don’t be under the illusion that you are contributing to the latter.

The Story Begins

Twenty five years ago I was an economist working for the Electricity Commission of NSW having fun measuring total factor productivity and trying to get engineers to use standard financial appraisals to guide investment and maintenance decisions.

That is, I was learning to relate to people whose objective functions, thought processes, approach to decision making and problem solving was very different to mine.

One day I got called up to the General Manager’s office, a gentleman named Barry Flanagan and was sat down next to two people that I had not worked with before; a Dr Brian Spalding from System Control – responsible for day to day operation of the power system and a Dr Paul Smith from Power Development – these were the guys, and they were all guys, that forecast future demand and recommended what new power stations to build and when. Historically the answers to these questions had been – the bigger the better and do it now. But things were changing.

The expected demand growth off the back of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s resources boom had failed to continue. A couple of new Bayswater/Eraring sized power stations (2640 MW) that were on the drawing board had the pen put through them and Mt Piper cut in half yet excess capacity remained.

New methods and techniques for better planning of the power system recommended by the 1986 MacDonnell Inquiry were being implemented and I for one, despite having contributed to that process, was questioning whether better planning was indeed the answer. The Greiner government’s commission of audit highlighted how much of the State’s ‘crisis’ debt levels was used to fund power stations and transmission lines. Greiner’s Commercial Policy Framework which was later to find its way into the 1995 Competition Principles Agreement meant that corporatisation, independent prices oversight, competitive neutrality etc. was on the horizon.

Nationally, the then Industries Assistance Commission had just released its report into the wonderfully titled ‘Government non-tax charges’ in which buried away in an appendix was the curious idea of a national grid and an interstate market for electricity. There was talk of a ‘special’ Premiers conference being held that would discuss microeconomic reforms including setting up an Electricity Working Group to look at whether extensions of the interstate grid were justified and assess the organisational options for achieving this.

More generally there was a growing discussion of the need for the domestic economy to lift its productivity performance. I still remember Ross Gittins at the end of a conference dinner berating a table of Industries Assistance Commission – soon to become the Industry Commission people over the fact that they kept banging on about tariffs and trade protection. They had won that war and it was time to move on to reform of the nontraded goods sector.

The context was right for reform of the electricity industry and that context had many tangled legs – no single one would have been sufficient to galvanise effective action.

So lesson 1: Be wary of single dimensional arguments for reform – if you want sustained successful implementation.

It didn’t matter what perspective you looked at it from:

  • a sector specific or microeconomic perspective
  • a financial perspective – in this case State public finance
  • a broader economic performance, macroeconomic or Commonwealth perspective
  • a short term political perspective due to price increases to cover the costs of excess capacity
  • a management or industrial relations perspective given what was happening inside the utilities at the time
  • or even an international one given what Thatcher was doing to the old CEGB and the 1989 Electricity Act

They all lead to the need for change.

If you think about some other areas of what may be considered obvious reforms – for example urban road pricing - they haven’t happened because the need for change has not been made from a sufficient number of different perspectives. Consequently the need to change is not great enough.

One of the things that concerns me a little about the current discussions over potential privatisations of network businesses in NSW and Queensland is that the arguments are single dimensional. The argument for privatisation is primarily being presented in terms of what other infrastructure can be funded from the net sale proceeds.

While this may appeal to the beneficiaries of this expenditure the same people no doubt pay electricity bills and what we are not hearing is the benefits to the electricity consumer and through them to the wider economy, for instance.

The single dimensional argument for reform creates an unnecessary vulnerability. It leaves governments open to the accusation that they have a single objective, maximising net sale proceeds, when in my experience this is rarely if ever the case. Reality is far more complex.

Another example relates to the role of national competition payments. These were an essential ingredient of the original competition policy reforms. When these intergovernmental agreements ran their course and there were discussions about what would replace them - the refrain was “States should not need to be bribed to do what they benefit from anyway”. Usually said with a superior, self-righteous tone.

Leave aside the arguments about how economic growth shows up in State Budgets as compared to the Commonwealth’s, due to the differences in tax bases and expenditure responsibilities. Such single dimensional, wooden headed attitudes revealed a naivety about how major reforms actually happen and the role that these payments played in delivery reform outcomes. I can’t tell you the number of arguments in support of specific reforms – often around a Cabinet Committee table – that were won with the statement “Unless we do X we will lose our national competition policy payments”. In this case, single dimensional perspectives resulted in lost opportunities.

Tell me and I forget…….Involve me and I learn

But back to Barry’s office. His message was characteristically direct. Governments were thinking about having an interstate electricity market. If they were going to have one he wanted one that worked. Our job for the next 9-12 months was to run trails of different types of markets within NSW to find out which one worked best.

I was stunned. This guy was wanting us to restructure the whole organisation and actually run the power system for real just to find out how markets work. Typical bonehead engineer I thought recalling some of the rugby prop forwards I had played with.

If he wants to know what a market would do give me a couple of people, enough computing grunt and I’ll tell him in a few weeks. Why allow us to disrupt thousands of employees, let us loose to play with billions of dollars’ worth of power stations – oh and there was the little issue of experimenting with the State’s power supply.

My approach – even if it gave correct answers which of course it would have – would have been wrong. It would have denied the business unit managers, their finance staff, the production and maintenance engineers and the control room operators the opportunity not just to learn how to work in a market 8 environment, but how it was supposed to work and to learn how their role fitted in with others.

One particularly interesting phase was the development of what we would now recognise as the NEM’s wholesale spot market. Given things like the nature of electricity demand, its production function, the technical inability to hold inventories and its fungibility, it is perhaps not surprising that to some of us this was going to be a commodity style market with both prices and supply offers able to be adjusted more or less continuously. Contracts would be financial derivatives rather than physical supply contracts. Power station engineers, at least at the time thought differently.

In their view the mechanisms in the output market needed to reflect the contract structures in the input markets – primarily coal. Coal contracts were typically long term with the ability to vary volumes within a band – say ±20% around a base level with 3 months’ notice.

So in the days before you could give people a sense of what equilibrium felt like by showing them the YouTube video of the bar scene from the movie Beautiful Mind we said “ok let’s run the power system that way and see what happens”.

We gave the “competing” generators a demand forecast for a three month period, they submitted offer prices that we ran through a mathematical programming model and we fed back to them production volumes and market prices. Armed with this information we allowed them to submit new offers and around we went again…. and again. And you guessed it; the fourth round offers did not vary much from the third round. It took three rounds to reach equilibrium…. at least ex ante.

We then ran the power system based on these offer prices – as the monthly financial results were published, actual demand varied from forecast, boiler tubes leaked, conveyor belts broke, wet coal got stuck in bunkers etc., the comfort and satisfaction each competitor felt with their average revenue, volume combinations disappeared.

At a review meeting with all the plant managers the clear consensus was “this won’t work”. However they were not yet willing to accept the sort of market I was proposing. It was too busy and variable. They wanted something that was more ‘set and forget’ so they could go back to doing what plant operators do.

That is until one of their own pointed out the similarities between what I was talking about and the control theory principles that as electrical engineers they were all pretty familiar with. At this point the lights went on so to speak. 10 So the next trial involved offer and market prices that varied every thirty minutes and in the process they discovered they could make those units do things that they would never have dreamed of before.

It doesn’t matter how well reform implementation is planned in policy or regulatory world – something will fall between the cracks and then you are relying on the people on the ground to know how to fill them.

One of the greatest attributes of the people who drive successful reform is the knowledge that they don’t do anything that is real. That the success of the reform largely depends on how the people who operate the system and its many parts respond when something happens that we could not have anticipated.

One of the reasons we knew that the lights would stay on when the market became a reality was that there were hundreds of people across NSW and Victoria who because of the trials that had been run in both States knew what they were doing and knew what other people - in what were now different organisations - were supposed to be doing.

I contrast this with rail reform in NSW where a perfectly good reform model fell into disrepute on implementation - largely because new institutions were 11 established without the people working within them being given the opportunity to learn how to work in a different structure.

So lesson 2: Give the people who have to work in the new structures and under different rules and policies the opportunity to learn. And who knows you may actually learn something from their experiences.

“Good Policy must be Marinated”

Back to Barry’s Office again. Having issued us our brief Barry’s next instruction was to go into the room next door and decide who of the three of us was going to lead the team so he could make the necessary announcement. He would be back in 20 minutes. That’s when things got really interesting. To understand why a team leader was necessary you probably need to have worked in a public sector agency….or worked with engineers.

If this task was going to be about setting up a market then as the only economist there was no way I was going to let an engineer run the show. Brian, quite sensibly, was not going to let an economist run his power system and Paul? Well Power Development Division had always lead the big things that happened so why wouldn’t he lead?

We were still arguing about this when after 20 minutes Barry stuck his head in the room and asked “Well....?” The three of us looked at one another and in unison said “We will all lead”. Barry huffed, rolled his eyes and left.

Thus begun one of the most productive professional relationships of my career. One that in the case of my fellow Commissioner Brian Spalding continues to his day. One based on having a common purpose, mutual respect for and recognition of the legitimacy of the other’s viewpoint and trust. Ingredients that while not often explicitly spoken about are an essential element of the environment necessary for successful reform. Successful reform won’t happen without it.

From a circumstance where different perspectives and viewpoints needed to and could be heard and issues debated on their merits – not decided on the basis of whose mouth they came out of - and where we each recognised that we needed the others, developed a decision making criteria.

Any proposal had to pass a three part test – somewhat similar to the prominent economist who said he would never publish something unless he could express it mathematically, graphically and in prose.

Proposals had to stack up from an

  • economic and policy viewpoint
  • an operational and engineering viewpoint
  • a commercial and financial sustainability perspective

E.P.F -  it had to conform to the laws of economics, physics and finance before it got to first base. It may sound obvious but all too often our processes don’t make sufficient room for this to be done. There was no point fixing an operational issue in a manner that created a financial or policy problem – or a policy issue in a manner that creates unmanageable financial problems – such an approach does not lead to sustainable solutions.

This way of working – giving the different perspectives on what works a chance to be heard on an equal footing - indeed demanding that they be expressed, was continued when the NSW team and the equivalent Victorian team combined to integrate their two markets; into the COAG working groups we were involved in; into the National Grid Management Council and its processes and into institutional design. It is reflected in the AEMC’s culture, processes and governance arrangements.

Once the NEM was going to be more than just NSW and Victoria and its development came under the auspices of COAG, a handful of Commonwealth Officials played a critical role in creating the right 14 environment for reform at least when it came to the NEM – mainly by what they didn’t do. What they didn’t do is develop proposals for how this market would work and go through the motions of ‘consulting’ with the States. They didn’t listen politely to proposals from the States, then walk out and seek to have the Commonwealth impose their solution politically.

They operated a ‘College of Cardinals’ like process. Their role was to book the venue, make sure the right people from the States and industry were in the room. Then keep the door locked while the State and industry people worked out what this market would look like and how it was going to work. They knew what they didn’t know and confined their role to assessing whether what the others came up with satisfied the policy objectives. We spent a lot of time in various locked rooms across the country.

Even if the Commonwealth officials did know all the answers – knowing them was not the point. It was the other people in the room who by and large had to walk out and implement the reforms, work with the outcomes and lead others, so they needed to understand them and own them.

So lesson 3: Culture and good process matters and needs to be explicitly considered if the right environment for successful reform is to be created. If reform is to be ongoing and responsibility for managing it given 15 to institutions it needs to be designed into how they are lead, governed and operate.

The Story Continues...

The NEM passed its 15th Anniversary late last year and to mark the occasion, the AEMC with the assistance of KPMG published a case study of the associated reform process. I have discussed three particular lessons that relate to creating the right environment for reform.

  1. That the right context will have many strands
  2. Give the people that have to work in the new structures the opportunity to learn
  3. Culture and processes that have integrity matter.

By drawing on the experiences of over 30 other people who were involved during the 1990’s this publication identifies out eight lessons for successful, enduring microeconomic reform.

Lessons that are hard wired into the AEMC and we will need to draw on as we deal with the current and future phases of the market’s evolution.

When we started the market we knew we were changing the way the industry would develop due to the changes in risk allocation, incentives and price signals. The drivers of how the sector developed would shift from generators to retailers. Changes in technology, relative prices, business models and 16 government policies – often from areas other than the energy portfolios – are continuing that trend with a shift in ‘power’ from retailers and regulated network businesses to consumers.

Consumer representatives, industry participants, governments and market institutions all have a role in facilitating the transition. The Commission for its part is in the process of making rule changes that came out of our Power of Choice review which sought to put consumers in a better position to recognise when the value of energy services to them was greater than the costs to the system of providing it.

Many of these rule changes relate to how network businesses are regulated, and recognise opportunities or to redefine where the boundaries are drawn between competitive and regulated sectors.

Another important ingredient is the lessons learnt from our reviews of retail competition. Nothing will bring the reform process unstuck like consumers that have negative experiences.

In thinking about how to manage this on-going reform process so the outcomes are sustainable it is useful from time to time to remind ourselves of the circumstances and objectives that started this story and the ingredients that delivered previous successes.

Thank you.

Long term priorities for development of the National Electricity Market

03 June 2014

CEDA Speech by John Pierce – 3rd June 2014

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Thank you Simon and CEDA for putting on today’s event. A few weeks ago I was across the Ditch in Wellington, killing a little time in a coffee shop before an appointment. There were two people sitting next to me having a very engaged and animated conversation.....about house insurance. They were comparing notes on the different policies they were on and of other policies from different companies they had received quotes from.

Two things struck me about their conversation. The first was the level of emotion..... there was none. Their tone was very ‘matter of fact’ without a hint of angst or frustration borne of confusion. They had the demeanour of people who were confident they knew what they were talking about.

The second was the range of things they were comparing……premiums of course, but also the level of excess, exclusions and how pleasant and 2 informative the voice on the other end of the phone was when they rang this company or that.

And I thought, “that’s it!”

How can we get to a world where people are as comfortable shopping for energy as they are house insurance…….or car insurance or bank loans or a myriad of other services where we take choice and competition for granted.

Now I often hear people say that energy is complicated. Well guess what so are the financial services or telecommunications sectors or even groceries, if you try and explain the retail offerings to people by describing the processes and technology that make up the supply chain.

Of course it wasn’t long before John Pierce the human being, eavesdropping in a coffee shop reverted to Pierce the econocrat who thought “confident, well informed consumers”….. notice how that term depersonalises our thought processes…..” is one thing, but if their choices are going to result in efficient operation, investment and innovation along the supply chain and hence make a positive contribution to productivity growth in the economy more generally, the prices and other characteristics of the services being offered to these individual consumers need to reflect the costs to the system of supplying them. The supply chain then needs to be 3 flexible enough to respond to these consumer choices. Generally this requires price levels AND structures to be capable of communicating the consequences of these choices on underlying demand and supply at each link in the supply chain.”

Pierce of the AEMC recognised that these two New Zealanders were unknowingly living the consumer priority in the Australian Energy Market Commission’s Strategic Priorities for energy market development. The econocrat was thinking about the market priority and both are needed.

Pierce the human being thought it best not to burden the house insurance shoppers with this revelation and left for his appointment without disturbing their search for Pareto Optimality.

The Consumer Priority aims to allow consumers to participate confidently in the energy market and that they can see a benefit to themselves from doing so. Participate in the competitive generation and retail markets, through their consumption and contract choices and in the network sector, through the impact of these choices and through participation in the regulatory processes.

Underpinning this is a view as to who you want to be driving the way the sector operates and develops in response to changing technologies, costs and relative prices.

Importantly, and in common with the market priority, it also requires reflection on how risks of various types are allocated, primarily between consumers and equity investors, but also in this game, taxpayers.

In the old world of state-based utilities, the sector’s development – perhaps quite appropriately for the times – was largely driven by planners employed in what was often labelled the “Power Development Division” where the focus was on building generation capacity. When energy demand was growing at 6 per cent plus per annum some would argue that this focus was fair enough.

A consequence of this type of industry structure however is that investment risks fall on consumers. When demand growth slowed to around 3 per cent per annum but generation plant was still being built as if it was 6 per cent, prices rose to recover the costs of the excess capacity.

With the start of the wholesale NEM more than 15 years ago, it was recognised that the drivers of the way the sector developed would shift from generation to retailers and the way networks were regulated.

It was also recognised, indeed intended, that investment risk would shift to the owners of generation capacity. If too much capacity was built wholesale prices would fall. Competing generators need not be any better at forecasting the future than the planners, but the consequences would sure be different.

What we are experiencing now is….. admittedly what can at times be in an untidy manner……. a transition to the next phase of that trend where consumers, doing what they do best – making consumption decisions – drive the way the sector develops.

Consumer representatives, governments, the businesses operating in the sector, and market institutions such as the AEMC and the Australian Energy Regulator all have a role in facilitating this transition. For the Commission’s part perhaps the two most important or at least visible pieces of work are the Rule changes flowing from the Power of Choice Review and our reviews of retail competition.

Power of Choice was a package with numerous elements. Each element to varying degrees depends on the others. Three fundamental building blocks though are the Rule changes dealing with (i) the way network charges are structured, (ii) the development of a market for the data that new metering technologies can provide consumers, retailers and distribution network operators, and (iii) arrangements that allow for multiple trading relationships at the consumer’s connection point.

All are a bit “techy” and looked at individually each in isolation might not seem world shattering. Taken together however they create the opportunity for consumer choice about how they use this stuff to drive efficient delivery of energy services.

The work we have done as part of the Retail Competition reviews identified four things energy consumers need for there to be coffee shop conversations like the house insurance conversation I overheard in New Zealand.

  1. A trusted source of advice that allows them to compare “apples with apples”,
  2. Knowing that consumer protections were in place and that the reliability of their physical supply was unaffected by shopping around,
  3. That the potential savings made shopping around worthwhile, and
  4. That doing so would be relatively easy to do and not overly time consuming.

Energy of course is an all-pervasive input to economic activity. There is a strong link between the productivity of this sector and that of the broader economy. This is why the energy sector was a particular focus of the microeconomic and competition policy reforms of the 1990’s and the resulting wholesale market arrangements have been an enduring reform success.

Creating the conditions that allow consumer choice to drive the way the sector and the market for energy services develops will help open the next chapter of what is a productivity improvement story.

Governments naturally tend to have objectives that go beyond these consumer and market priorities for energy market development. Concerns for vulnerable customers and the environmental impacts of the sector are obvious examples. That is quite appropriate of course because after all they are elected to govern and I am not.

How these objectives are pursed,…… whether the instruments used to implement them are compatible with the way energy is bought and sold and the risk allocation that allows the market to operate……. however has important implications for how effectively the energy market can work in the long term interests of consumers.

Like the market arrangements themselves, policy instruments that depend on a particular view of the future, on predictions of relative prices and technology costs are likely to result in inferior outcomes to those that can achieve their objectives whatever the future may bring.

Thank you.

Key priorities for developing energy markets

23 October 2013

AEMC Chairman, John Pierce, presented a speech at the Eastern Australia’s Energy Markets Outlook 2013 Conference. His speech launched the AEMC’s strategic priorities for electricity and natural gas market development. 

Where: InterContinental Hotel Sydney

Date: Wednesday 23 October 2013

Topic: Key priorities for developing energy markets

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Speech

Introduction

Thank you for inviting me to speak this morning.

The topic for this session is “key priorities for developing energy markets.”

At one level the priorities for development of the stationary energy sector are no different today than they were in the late 1980s, early 1990s when NSW and Victoria started questioning the traditional public utility industry structure and experimenting with the idea of a market, with its shift in risk from customers to equity holders.

Or soon after that when Governments signed up to the Competition Principles Agreement and the Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and Related reforms in which “…a fully competitive National Electricity Market (NEM) in southern and eastern Australia…” was one of the major and perhaps most enduring of the so called related reforms.

As an all pervasive input to economic activity, along with labour and efficient capital markets, the productivity and efficiency of the energy sector underpins the productivity, competitiveness and long term growth potential of the economy more generally. Not to mention the welfare of the household sector.

Perhaps many of the issues that have arisen in the last few years owe their origin to the longer term structural links between productivity growth in the domestic energy sector and the country’s growth potential not being front of mind.

Governments of course have legitimate policy interests outside of and beyond market and regulatory arrangements that promote productivity growth in the domestic energy sector. Where those interests impact on the sector however, I suspect there is scope to do better at achieving these policy interests while maintaining efficient energy market and regulatory arrangements.

The changes in the gas market, rising electricity prices, debates over climate change, land use and other environmental policies, changes in technology and the relative costs of demand and supply side options and changes in the way energy is used, have all prompted almost unprecedented interest and attention in energy markets. All this increased attention reinforces the need to remain focused on longer-term strategic priorities for energy market development.

The energy prices and other outcomes that we experience as consumers are a combination of:

  • the competitive market segments – generation and retail;
  • the regulated network sector; and
  • the impact of governments’ policies – think of the carbon price, the renewable energy target, feed in tariffs and access to gas reserves, for instance.

The way these three combine or interact with one another is just as important as the individual components. When thinking about market development priorities that impact on productivity, prices, reliability, system security, the way energy is used in combination with technology to provide energy services and environmental outcomes you must start with an understanding of how these three inter-relate and affect one another.

One of the strategic priorities the AEMC set out in our last review in 2011 related to the regulation of transmission and distribution networks. A number of changes are already underway in that regard – last year saw the finalisation of the rule changes on the economic regulation of network businesses proposed by the Energy Users Rule Change Committee and the AER. The AER is now in the process of implementing these changes through its better regulation program. The impacts of these new rules on network revenues are expected to start flowing through to customers starting from next year.

While that major piece of work addressed the revenues earned by network businesses, in the next few months we will be looking at the way distribution businesses structure their tariffs. Following recommendations made in the AEMC’s

Power of Choice review, we recently received a rule change from SCER to amend the distribution pricing principles in the National Electricity Rules. The goal is to achieve distribution pricing structures that are based on the drivers of network costs, so that as far as possible consumers are facing prices that reflect the impact of their consumption decisions on efficient network costs. One element of the rule change is to require distributors to consult with consumers on their tariff structures. This is consistent with one of the strategic priorities in the 2013 Strategic Priorities Review that the Commission is releasing today.

Strategic priorities review

This is the second strategic priorities review for the AEMC and it sets out three key priorities that we have labelled: a consumer priority, a gas priority and a market priority. The consumer and market priorities are retained from those we developed in 2011, but with a slight re-focus. The gas priority is new.

We aimed to build as much consensus as possible across the sector as to what the key priorities for energy markets should be. This involved considerable consultation with stakeholders including a series of well-attended stakeholder workshops, a public forum and a discussion paper. The positive engagement of stakeholders in preparing this document confirms the value of using a highly consultative and interactive process to develop our strategic priorities. It also reflects the AEMC’s responsibility to carry out our work in a transparent, predictable way. This is a theme I will return to.

The consumer priority is about enabling consumers to confidently participate in all parts of the energy supply chain where they desire to do so. This reflects an environment in which consumers are presented with greater opportunities for active participation as technologies advance, retailers differentiate their offerings and competition increases. For example, advanced metering technology is providing richer consumption information and more service possibilities. Distributed generation is blurring the traditional delineation between consumers and producers of electricity. Options for demand-side participation are increasing in retail and generation markets. And the value consumers place on reliability will increasingly feed into the framework for determining network reliability standards and targets.

Our work in this area includes the rule change requests dealing with connecting embedded generators and those that follow from our Power of choice review, such as introducing a demand response mechanism into the wholesale market and a competitive market for the provision of metering services. We will also shortly be releasing our consumer engagement blueprint which is a supplementary report to the NSW Retail Competition Review and has broad applicability to energy markets. It includes recommendations on how to provide the information, tools and support that consumers have told us they want in order to choose energy plans that are right for them.

The gas priority is about the development of efficient gas markets. Our work to address this priority has recently begun with the publication of the gas market scoping study.

The market priority, which is somewhat an overarching priority, is about an effective market, regulatory and policy environment for investment. Because future investment requirements are relatively uncertain, market arrangements must be flexible enough to facilitate investments that can be adapted in line with changing policies, market conditions and external factors.

Our current work relevant to this market priority includes our transmission and distribution reliability frameworks review, as well as the Reliability Panel’s review of the reliability settings which determine the price envelope for the wholesale market, our NEM financial market resilience project, and the detailed design and testing of the optional firm access proposal.

As I said earlier, the consumer and market priorities are evolutions of two of the priorities we developed in 2011, reflecting their continued importance at the centre of effective energy market arrangements. However, today I would like to focus a little more on the new priority – the development of efficient gas markets.

Gas in eastern Australia

Over the last 10 to 15 years the domestic gas market has been relatively stable. Growth has mainly occurred in the gas-fired generation sector. Gas prices were locked in through contracts, generally subject to an annual adjustment for inflation.

The east coast market is now experiencing a structural increase to both demand and supply in response to the establishment of an LNG export industry. Although export will not commence until late-2014, the domestic market is already feeling the effects of greater competition for gas.

On the supply-side, the key uncertainty appears to be whether sufficient reserves can be developed in time to meet LNG export schedules and the needs of domestic users, with domestic contracts rolling off at around the same time the LNG projects are ramping up.

From a demand perspective, a new market dynamic facing domestic gas users is the competing LNG export industry – and the effect that has on prices. The way prices are determined also looks to be changing, with links to the oil price reflecting the influence of LNG pricing.

As the east coast gas market transitions to this new paradigm influenced by international energy markets, there has been a renewed focus on the efficiency of the gas supply chain.

What does this mean for market participants and consumers?

Long term contracts are a feature of the gas market due to the capital intensive nature and long lives of the assets, and the needs of large end users who also require certainty of supply and price to secure finance for their own activities.

A positive feature of these arrangements is that the risk associated with investment in gas infrastructure is appropriately borne by the investor. These contracting arrangements in gas provide certainty to producers, pipeline owners and end-users.

On the other hand, the widespread use of contracts, which are usually confidential, limits gas pricing transparency. However, as the eastern market has matured and the number of participants increased, producers and pipeline owners have recovered a significant proportion of their initial investment and have been willing to enter into shorter term contracts. A limited amount of trading also takes place on spot markets where prices can be seen; however, this is primarily for the purpose of participants managing daily gas imbalances, rather than acting as the source of supply.

An increase in the use of markets to undertake short term trades of gas and pipeline capacity is an attribute of mature and well developed gas markets around the world. However, given the size of the Australian gas industry, it is not yet clear how many trading markets can be efficiently supported, while providing the liquidity and depth that supports credible price signals and financial hedging products.

Gas as a strategic priority

Consistent with the AEMC’s remit, this gas strategic priority is focused on the means of exchange used in downstream parts of the supply chain from when the gas enters the pipeline system to its delivery to end users.

This kind of work will not directly address the well-publicised upstream supply-side issues currently affecting the eastern gas market. Nonetheless, we recognise the importance of the way gas is bought and sold as part of the overall efficiency of the natural gas supply chain.

Throughout the strategic priorities review process, we received considerable support from stakeholders to focus on this aspect of gas markets as one of our three strategic priorities.

Gas scoping study

The AEMC also commissioned a scoping study on the current state of the east coast gas market that we published at the end of September. It provides an overview of changes underway and identifies areas of potential improvement in the downstream market and regulatory arrangements.

Over 20 interviews were conducted with market participants, a public workshop was held in Sydney, and eight submissions were received as part of the consultation process in undertaking this work.

Over the last 10 years there has been substantial investment in transmission pipelines, with the eastern gas market now fully integrated. Increased trading flexibility and information transparency has also occurred through initiatives such as the Short Term Trading Markets, Bulletin Board and Gas Statement of Opportunities.

However, the scale of the changes which are occurring in the gas sector means that it is important to evaluate whether the existing downstream market frameworks continue to be well suited to the new environment in which they are now placed, taking into account the commercial and practical needs of participants. In effect, it was considered prudent to take stock.

Given the uncertainty that exists around what direction that downstream gas market development should take over the next 10 to 15 years, the scoping study identified the need for a strategic gas market development path within which the industry can work towards achieving a more mature and well-functioning market.

Good energy policy must be marinated

That sentiment strikes at what former Federal Energy Minister Martin Ferguson recently wrote in a piece in the AFR – that “good energy policy must be marinated”. That is, whilst the time it takes to develop policy may frustrate some, stakeholders and policy makers need time to conduct the processes that underpin good policy. Time to consult, time to listen and time to learn from each other.

Not only is good process more likely to produce the best long term outcomes, it also helps to bring along stakeholders with the process. A good policy may risk failure if it does not have buy-in from those affected.

The AEMC’s processes for its rule change requests and reviews are reflected in the process we undertook in developing our strategic priorities. We consulted with a broad audience to build consensus around the future focus for developing energy markets.

In December, the NEM will mark its fifteen year anniversary since its commencement. While the development of the NEM can be seen as a landmark microeconomic reform, it also represents a successful process of developing and implementing enduring reform. One that continues.

In the discussion of our market priority in today’s report we make the point that it is important that all policy and regulatory decisions understand the impacts on sectors they are likely to affect.

The Business Council of Australia’s recent “Action Plan for Enduring Prosperity” suggested that “Australia needs an integrated approach to energy and climate change mitigation policy that is coherent with our economic goals.”

Some stakeholders argue that the way to achieve better integration would be to change the National Electricity Objective. My response would be that the current NEM governance arrangements benefit from two key attributes: a clear and appropriate allocation of roles and clear objectives associated with each role. This brings clarity, transparency and accountability to the decision-making of the respective institutions.

When I was asked about this issue at the Senate Inquiry on Electricity Prices last year, I compared good governance arrangements to a good football team.

Everyone on the team has the same objective – in this case market and regulatory arrangements that deliver outcomes in the long term interests of consumers – but we all have our own position and our own role. If the prop thinks that the five-eighth is not doing a good job, the worst thing he can do is try to do the five-eight’s job for him. The AEMC’s role in making and amending the rules that apply to the energy sector is one position in the team, albeit an important one.

There are other manifestations of government that play in different positions: they deal with environmental issues in a systemic sense, such as climate change and in a local sense, such as land use planning. The same around social policy. And the expertise in these areas is necessarily different. Just like a football team, we all have different roles, but we get the best outcomes when the people in those different roles coordinate with one another.

Coordination and information sharing is precisely why process is so important in developing good energy policy. Not only between governments but between regulated and unregulated parts of the markets, and those most impacted by changes: consumers.

Thank you.

Strategic priorities for energy market development

16 October 2013

AEMC Chairman, John Pierce, presented a speech at the Energy Users Association of Australia. His speech discussed the AEMC’s strategic priorities for energy development, as well as two future rule changes that have direct relevance for consumers – a proposal to reform distribution pricing arrangements and a proposal to implement a demand response mechanism. 

Annual EUAA Conference 2013 – Empowerment through participation

AEMC Chairman, John Pierce, Speech

Where: Royal on the Park, Cnr Alice and Albert Sts, Brisbane

Date: 16 October 2013

Topic: Strategic priorities for energy market development

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Speech

Introduction

My thanks to the Energy Users Association of Australia (EUAA) for the invitation to speak today. I should start by introducing my organisation for those who are not familiar with us.

The Australian Energy Market Commission was established in July 2005 as a national body with two principal functions: we make and amend rules for the National Electricity Market and for elements of natural gas markets. We also provide market development advice to the Standing Council on Energy and Resources. So our work consists of assessing rule changes, which can be initiated by anybody except ourselves, and carrying out reviews, which are commissioned by SCER.

The energy prices and other outcomes that we see as consumers are a combination of what happens in the competitive generation and retail sectors, what happens in the regulated network sectors, and of government policies which impact the energy sector. Think of the carbon price, RET and Feed-intariffs, for example.

One of the things we do each year is publish a report on the drivers of expected price movements. This shows that network prices and the combined effect of governments’ policies have been major drivers. At the end of 2012 major changes were made to the Rules governing the economic regulation of network businesses. The AER is currently developing guidelines to give effect to these rule changes, and the first regulatory determinations to occur under the new rules will be in NSW and ACT in mid-2014. For Queensland, the first determinations will be in place by mid-2015.

At the beginning of this Rule change process and numerous times since we have said that network price outcomes were a function of the Rules, how the Rules are applied and the corporate governance of the network businesses. It is also a function of how reliability standards are determined. The Commission has recently published advice on a national framework for determining reliability targets for distribution networks and is close to finalising advice dealing with the transmission sector.

This morning I would like to talk about the AEMC’s strategic priorities for energy development, which we have developed in consultation with industry and consumers, and will underpin our advice to SCER and our approach to rule making.

I would then like to focus on two proposed rule changes that have direct relevance for consumers, including large energy users like those represented here today — a proposal to reform distribution price structure arrangements and a proposal to implement a demand response mechanism.

Strategic priorities for energy market development

The topic of your annual conference also resembles one of the AEMC’s three strategic priorities for energy market development that we proposed in a discussion paper in April this year. That discussion paper set out a consumer priority, a gas priority and a market priority.

We aimed to build as much consensus as possible as to what the key priorities for energy market development should be. This involved a series of well-attended stakeholder workshops, a public forum and a discussion paper. We talked to a range of stakeholders – including individual consumers and consumer representative bodies – about their key concerns for the sector to help identify priority areas for our future work program.

We are due to publish the final report next week where we will confirm our three priorities. In brief:

The consumer priority is about strengthening consumer participation in energy markets. This includes providing greater opportunities for consumers to effectively participate in the monopoly network sector (through participation in regulatory processes, for example – I believe Andrew will talk more about that after the tea break) and to participate in competitive retail and generation markets, perhaps more directly. The two rule changes I will talk about shortly are part of our work program under this priority.

The gas priority is about the development of gas market trading mechanisms, the need to examine the efficiency in downstream market arrangements. That is, it is about the mechanisms through which gas is traded (the means of exchange), rather than upstream supply issues, which are outside of the AEMC’s remit. Though the two are obviously related.

At the end of September the AEMC published a gas market scoping study, which provides an overview of changes in the east coast gas market. The study revealed that the existing gas market and regulatory arrangements have served us well, but that the scale of the changes which are occurring in the gas sector means that it is now important to evaluate whether they continue to be well suited to the new environment in which they are now placed, taking into account the commercial and practical needs of participants.

The market priority, is somewhat of an overarching priority, concerned with the way market, regulatory and policy environments interact and impact prices and investment. This reflects the importance of predictable but flexible market arrangements, and of open and transparent processes for change. This priority emphasises the importance of policy decisions taking account of impacts on all sectors they are likely to affect. We are most likely to get integrated policy outcomes when decisions are take in a transparent manner and after full consultation with all affected parties.

Overlaying all of these things though is the underlying rationale for the market and regulatory arrangements that we have – productivity growth in a sector that is so vital to Australia’s longer term potential economic growth.

For those that have been around long enough to recognise the relationship between the microeconomic and competition policy objectives and the domestic energy sectors; - perhaps many of the issues that have arisen in the sector over the last few years owe their origin to those links not being front of mind.

Rule changes

The rule changes I would like to focus on today fall into the two areas where the AEMC has most influence, namely the regulated and competitive sectors.

The first relates to how network costs are reflected in price structures. The second represents a greater opportunity for users to directly offer demand reductions into the wholesale market at the prevailing spot price.

These two projects are yet to commence and they represent an opportunity to engage with the AEMC over the coming months as we consult on whether and how to implement the changes. We will be asking for views and information from any interested stakeholder about how we can better promote the long term interests of consumers through these rule changes.

Both projects were recommendations of the AEMC’s Power of Choice review, which presented a package of recommendations to Commonwealth, state and territory ministers in November last year. The package focuses on supporting consumers of all sizes to actively participate in the energy market. It offers a suite of options to help consumers manage their electricity consumption and, in turn, their electricity expenditure. It short, the objective is consistent with the theme of your conference on “Empowerment through participation.”

Flexible pricing

The AEMC’s Power of Choice review made a series of recommendations to move towards more efficient and flexible pricing. A key part of this involves changing the way distribution networks structure their tariffs. We have made changes through the network regulation rule change that will affect the size of the distribution cost pie. How the resulting pie is then sliced between consumers depends on the way in which network tariffs are structured. The rule change request from SCER on distribution pricing arrangements is designed to tackle this latter issue.

Distribution tariff reform

SCER submitted the rule change request last month after considering the evidence that there are significant costs and foregone opportunities arising from the absence of clear price signals to consumers.

The rules currently provide a framework and guiding principles for how network businesses should structure their network tariffs. The proposed rule change would amend these principles and other provisions to encourage more efficient network price structures. It would require network charges to be based on the drivers of network costs as far as possible so that consumers are paying prices that reflect the impact of their consumption decisions on network costs.

The SCER rule change also seeks to build in greater consultation between distributors and their customers in structuring their prices. Part of this would involve distributors consulting with consumers in developing a pricing structure policy to accompany the distributor’s regulatory proposal. In assessing the rule change, we will be considering how to include a conversation about the structure of tariffs throughout the regulatory process, rather than the structure just coming out at the end of the process.

It is important that, when distributors develop new pricing structures and charges, consumers are engaged and have an understanding of any changes so that they can make informed choices and decisions. The AEMC recognised this in the Power of Choice review, and proposed that there should be a greater role for consumers and retailers to review pricing options set by network businesses. This has also been raised by IPART in a separate rule change request to the AEMC, which we will be considering in tandem with the SCER request.

The main benefits of changes of this nature may be felt over the medium to long term. They could shrink the size of the pie further, as changing consumption patterns in response to new prices will focus infrastructure investment where it is needed and valued most. But consumers with a flat load profile or those who have some flexibility to respond to the new prices will also tend to benefit in the shorter term by shrinking the size of the slice they have to pay for.

We plan to publish a consultation paper early next month and I encourage you to provide submissions to inform us of your views on these important issues. I would also note that this rule change is part of a broader package. SCER is pursuing a wide range of reforms aimed at ensuring that network infrastructure is built, priced and utilised effectively.

Demand response mechanism

Power of Choice offered another recommendation which could provide opportunities for large energy consumers to reduce their expenditure. We recommended the introduction of a new demand response mechanism, which would allow consumers, or third parties acting on consumers’ behalf, to directly participate in the wholesale market and to receive the spot price as a reward for reducing demand.

Some consumers find it feasible to physically adjust their consumption in response to spot prices under specific contractual arrangements such as interruptible tariffs, spot pass-through and scheduled demand. However, these involve a degree of risk, transaction and ‘hassle’ costs that are difficult to manage for many commercial and industrial users.

Under our proposed mechanism, demand resources would be treated in a similar way to generation, and would be paid the wholesale electricity spot price for reducing demand.

At the request of SCER, AEMO has been tasked with drafting a rule change proposal to give effect to the mechanism.

AEMO has developed a detailed design proposal covering the design principles including metering, the baseline consumption methodology, settlement and prudentials, reporting and governance. The document is available on the AEMO website.

We anticipate that AEMO will submit the rule change proposal to the AEMC by December 2013. The EUAA has recognised the benefits a mechanism like this could offer for consumers and I would encourage you to participate in the AEMC’s process on this rule change, as the proposed mechanism could provide a significant revenue stream for businesses that have some flexibility in their electricity use.

Concluding remarks

I have focussed on these two rule changes as they are still somewhat in the formative stages, and both have the potential to materially affect the electricity expenditure of end users. I would of course encourage you all to engage with the AEMC’s consultation processes for these two rule changes once they are initiated.

We expect a consultation paper on distribution pricing principles to be published in November. A consultation paper for demand response mechanism will likely be published later in 2014, depending on the outcome of AEMO’s processes.

The rule changes form a part of the Commission’s wider work program, all of which is aimed at improving long term outcomes for energy consumers. Our rule change and review processes represent an important opportunity for energy users to get involved in shaping future outcomes in the market. The value of our work will be greater if we are exposed to a variety of views in assessing proposals against the national electricity, retail and gas objectives.

Thank you again for the opportunity to address you all today.

The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the National Electricity Market: What was the question again?

14 August 2013

AEMC Chairman, John Pierce, presented a discussion paper and addressed the attendees at the Maddocks Energy Signature Lunch on 7 August 2013. His speech addressed market achievements and challenges; revisited reasons for the NEM’s development; and outlined priorities for further improvements. 

Title: The hitchhiker's guide to the NEM: What was the question again?

Location: Maddocks Energy Signature Lunch

7 August 2013 Sydney, Australia

John Pierce Chairman, AEMC

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Speech

Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today.

When I was a Treasury Secretary, it was not unusual when sitting around with my colleagues from other jurisdictions for the conversation to turn to the relationship with our various Auditor Generals. Similarly when I was an Australian Government Departmental Secretary I attended two days of bi-annual talks between Australian and Canadian Government Department heads from all portfolios. As people were taking their seats on the first day I whispered to an Australian colleague, “Fifty bucks says we don’t get to afternoon tea without a collective whinge about Provinces and States.” We didn’t make it to morning tea.

So it was not surprising when sitting down with a group of Canadian and US utility regulators a few months back that the conversation turned to comparing notes on their relationship with government, consumer and environmental groups and the businesses they regulate. Basically they were discussing the difference in the perceptions and objectives of these groups and the difficulties that these differences posed for them as regulators.

At one point in the conversation I said …“You should read Plato’s Republic”… I was met with blank looks “….You know, the Allegory of the Cave…….” Finally a regulator from Ontario said "Are all Australian regulators so nerdy?” Keen to dispel such notions I replied “…..Well Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy then.” There were signs of recognition but still uncertainty as to the relevance to the topic under discussion.

The story goes something like this……

“A race of hyper-intelligent beings build a super computer called Deep Thought…our energy systems….to find the answer to the Meaning of Life, the Universe and Everything…..the public interest test often given to regulators in North America or the long term interests of consumers in Australia.

When Deep Thought says that the answer is 42, the hyper-intelligent beings can’t relate the answer to the question so they build another computer…the Earth… another Inquiry…to find the question that will give meaning to the answer. It seems to me that different people come up with different answers because they are answering different questions. Might be useful if we agree on the question up front, don’t you reckon?”

When viewed in an international context Australia’s national electricity market – or “NEM” – is rather unique and somewhat enviable. For most of its 15 year history, the NEM has performed well against a range of indicators including price, timely investment, reliability, safety and security. More recently, sharply rising retail prices, falling demand, low average but volatile wholesale spot prices, and other developments have caused some to question whether the system is still performing well. Check against delivery Check against delivery 3

I have heard suggestions that the wholesale energy only NEM design should be reconsidered in light of the Renewable Energy Target whose design has more in common with so called capacity “markets”, where the quantity of generation investment is determined by a central authority rather than by the balance of demand and supply with its associated risk allocation.

There has been a lot of discussion around the way transmission and distribution networks are regulated in the wake of price increases flowing from past regulatory determinations, and various aspects of the retail sector’s operation.

And of course the gas sector is going through its own series of “questionings”.

Now in pondering further changes to the energy sector or assessing its performance, it is important to recall “what was the question again?” without which we risk getting an answer we don’t want or understand. This includes questions around what we want our energy system to do; the underlying cause of current concerns; whether existing institutional and governance arrangements will develop solutions; and the relationship with broader policy and external regulatory settings and institutions, including for instance those designed to address emission levels.

A series of reviews and other focused investigations have already taken place or are underway. The improvements identified in recently completed work or work underway will help leverage the benefits offered by Australia’s liberalised

electricity sector. This is a program of work that will move towards completing the reform of the electricity sector that was started by creating the wholesale NEM in the first place.

So what was the question again? 

The design of the NEM largely began in the early part of the 1990s. This was a period of substantive microeconomic reform across the Australian economy largely in response to Australia’s poor relative and absolute economic performance. I hardly need to remind you of this as many of you played a large part in the reforms and we are all old enough to have lived through it.

You will recall that with electricity a vital input to a range of industries, and evidence of the costs of over investment and poor operational performance in generation being passed on to consumers, improving the efficiency of the electricity sector was viewed as a key ingredient in lifting Australia’s overall economic performance.

The resulting transformation of the sector can be described in many ways and from different perspectives. However, a fundamental question that was answered then and remains just as relevant in today’s discussions is “How do you the want risks to be allocated?”

A different risk allocation is perhaps the defining feature that distinguishes the NEM from the vertically integrated utility industry structure of old and the

capacity “markets” found in some other jurisdictions. In the latter, an “authority” plans investment based on expectations of demand and by necessity the costs are passed onto consumers. And so are the risks. If forecasts turn out to be inaccurate, and as we have seen this tends to be the case, and there is over investment, prices rise and consumers pay.

In the wholesale NEM design, generation businesses in competition with one another make these investment (and it must be said dis-investment) decisions. They may be no better at forecasting the future than were the utilities, however over investment results in lower prices and equity bears the cost of the decision – which is a very different risk allocation and very different incentives for efficiency.

I would suggest that any discussion of how to improve the NEM or how the NEM is affected by policy or regulatory changes needs to explicitly address this question of how risks are allocated…and we need to be comfortable with the answers.

Policy and regulatory decisions should be guided less by forecasts or projections of the future and perhaps more by how you want the resulting risks to be allocated.

Strategic priorities

In thinking about our particular universe, I have found it useful to divide it into three parts – and it’s important to know which part you’re in, in any point in time.

  1. Competitive retail and generation
  2. Regulated network sector
  3. Policy interventions from outside the sector that materially impact upon it

The effectiveness of the electricity sector frameworks that make up the first two parts is a topic the Commission has given considerable thought to in our current strategic priorities review. The Commission has proposed three priorities: I will focus today on the two proposed electricity sector priorities, which relate to effective market and regulatory arrangements and empowering consumers.

Our third proposed priority focuses on the implications of major changes in the gas sector on the east coast of Australia with the development of substantial LNG export capacity. The Commission will be releasing a gas market scoping study in the coming months.

Improvements to existing frameworks

I want to take a moment though to reflect on our processes. Change will always be a feature of energy markets and policy and regulatory arrangements, but it is important that the manner in which change is managed is transparent, based on clear objectives and relatively predictable.

In managing these changes, Pierce’s consistency theorem applies.

The consistency theorem states that, if a change is going to meet its objectives and not set you on a course of putting band aids on band aids, a necessary but not sufficient condition is that the:

  • economic or policy implications;
  • commercial and financial impacts; and
  • technical and operational aspects

need to be aligned or consistent with one another.

There is no point…in fact it could be quite dangerous…addressing an operational problem by a means that creates an unintended or unmanageable financial risk and vice versa.

The rule change and review processes administered by the AEMC are highly transparent, predictable and consultative. Nonetheless, we are always eager to identify process improvements that satisfy the consistency theorem. The

Productivity Commission raised in its recent report concerns that the rule change process can often take too long, and in particular, those that follow from reviews undertaken by the AEMC for SCER. The Commission has also been conscious of this concern through discussions we have had with stakeholders.

The Commission is considering options that might be available to improve timeliness of the rule change process without undermining the features of the rule change process that stakeholders tell us very clearly they value – extensive consultation, an opportunity to scrutinise the detailed rule drafting and a clear explanation by the AEMC of the reasons for our decisions. I am particularly keen to explore how we can move more effectively from the conclusions of our reviews to rule changes that implement the recommendations accepted by SCER.

I would encourage you to talk to us over the coming months with ideas on how we can improve the rule change process. We are very much at the stage of exploring options and ideas, and will be open to discuss any suggestions that can improve the process.

Effective market and regulatory arrangements 

A recent example of what we mean by effective market and regulatory arrangements are the changes we made last year to the rules governing the economic regulation of networks.

Network regulation rule change 

The new rules better equip the AER to develop methods and processes to achieve robust outcomes when setting revenues and prices for consumers in a number of areas. They focus on the importance of providing regulation that is adaptive to changing circumstances, without losing sight of the objective.

The new regulatory arrangements were the subject of a recent survey of investors by the Royal Bank of Canada. The survey found that the stability of the regulatory regime was the most important aspect of regulation for investors, followed by consistency of decisions and the predictability of outcomes. The same survey found that overwhelmingly investors viewed the changes to the rules as positive with 79 per cent of investors surveyed agreeing that the changes will improve regulation.

The AER is now in the process of developing the guidelines required by the rules on how it intends to apply the new rules in consultation with consumers and industry - the “better regulation” program. These new arrangements will impact on network prices as the next determinations commence. The first businesses in NSW will all have determinations under the new rules with effect from 1 July 2014. From the following year, 1 July 2015, the new rules will apply to the determinations of Energex and Ergon in Queensland and SA Power Networks in South Australia.

As the AEMC stated at the beginning of the rule change process, enhanced rules may be necessary to increase the ability and incentives to achieve efficient network prices but they are certainly not sufficient. The AER’s “better regulation” program and approach are critical. Moreover, how the Australian Competition Tribunal interprets the new rules will also have a bearing on the outcomes for consumers. The SCER recently announced that changes to the limited merits review process that will focus the decisions of the Australian Competition Tribunal on the long term interests of consumers. And of course, the corporate governance of network businesses is an important aspect in determining efficient prices. The outcomes are a function of at least three variables ─ the legal and regulatory framework, the application of the framework by the regulator, and the corporate governance of the businesses.

Consumer participation - network regulation 

As consumers ourselves, we have experience voicing demand through our choices. If we don’t like a price or service, we go to a competitor. But how do we as consumers demand better price and service outcomes in a monopoly regulated environment? And how do consumers engage in the increasingly complex regulatory process?

The SCER recently agreed to develop a national consumer advocacy body to strengthen the voice of consumers within the process. While there are a number of consumer advocacy organisations in place today, they have differing mandates and resources and generally operate at the state level.

Consumers can also contribute to the regulatory process by participating in the development of the regulated businesses’ investment plans. We introduced a change in the rules which explicitly requires the AER to consider how a network business consults with its consumers in reviewing businesses’ regulatory proposals. The work of SA Power Networks which has already launched a program which includes consumer workshops and an online survey is an early example of the initiatives being developed by networks.

Consumer participation - retail markets

And just as the role of consumers in the regulatory process is changing, so too is the role of consumers in retail energy markets. From both an industry and regulatory perspective, consumers are increasingly becoming more active participants in their energy use as opposed to passive users of a homogenous commodity, as it has traditionally been viewed.

The AEMC’s Power of choice review revealed that there are potentially material savings available across the system if consumers are provided with information, charges to reflect the value of using electricity at different times and technology to enable them to change their consumption behaviour.

And we are seeing retailers responding to consumer interest in their energy use by providing customised advice and information directly to customers via platforms, such as web portals and mobile phone applications. This kind of engagement and retailer responsiveness is most readily observed in Victoria, where retail price regulation was removed in 2009. Last year the South Australian government announced the removal of regulated prices. These changes move retail markets closer to the fully competitive retail markets that were envisaged when the NEM was developed.

NSW competition review

The Commission is now reviewing competition in the NSW energy retail markets. Its draft report was released in May which found that competition is effective as consumers have a choice of retailer and offer and are increasingly taking advantage of these choices.

Over 60 per cent of consumers have chosen to be on a market contract rather than the regulated price. Market contracts offer a range of discounts off the regulated price as well as choices such as different payment and contract terms or tariff structures.

Our market research found that consumers have a high degree of awareness of the option to choose their retailer – over 90 per cent – and switching rates are also high – 21 per cent of consumers switched suppliers last year. However, while high switching rates are an indicator of competitive market

activity, it does not necessarily follow that consumers are confident that they are making the right choices.

Indeed, consumers told us that while they were generally satisfied with their electricity supplier and there was a lot of information available – the information was confusing and complex. They also said the information was not the right type or in the right form to help them make a decision about an energy offer that suited them. So as part of the next stage of the NSW review the Commission is talking to consumers to further explore this issue.

Developing consumer engagement blueprint 

The Commission has agreed with the NSW government to develop a consumer engagement blueprint. The objective is to encourage market outcomes where consumers are confident they have the right information to choose an energy plan that suits their needs.

Different types of consumers, such as high and low consumption consumers, have a diverse set of needs. The essence of the benefits of competitive markets is the availability of products to suit those different needs. However, the proliferation of choice requires consumers to be able to choose which products suit their needs with confidence.

In developing our consumer engagement blueprint the Commission is talking to consumers through qualitative and quantitative research to find out what it

is they need to feel confident making choices. Specifically, we have assembled a number of focus groups as well as an online and telephone survey which can be used as a baseline to measure any changes in future.

We are also undertaking a separate stream of analysis that seeks to identify broad demographic characteristics of those consumers that are still on regulated tariffs. This will enable us to ascertain whether specific engagement or support programs are required.

The Commission will be delivering our final report and recommendations on the effectiveness of competition at the end of September. The consumer engagement blueprint will be delivered at the end of October.

One result arising from our initial research is that engagement is not necessarily just about picking an energy plan. That is, consumers that do not switch may still actively manage their energy use. It may be the case that by simply providing information in an appropriate form consumers will respond by changing their behaviour in a way that results in overall lower bills.

And as we found in Power of choice, enabling technologies such as smart meters and similar services empower consumers to control their energy use, but it also adds to complexity. The results of our research will inform the types of information and communication tools consumers want to aid their engagement within the market, with flow on consequences that support efficient investment decision making and competition.

Conclusion

And so in summary, the NEM and the broader sector have performed well over time, but further improvements need to be made and there is a work program in place to achieve this.

The Hitchhikers Guide to the NEM entry would read….

When assessing changes to competitive, regulation or policy sectors of the universe:

  • know what the question is that you are trying to answer ─ so you will know what to do with the answer;
  • always take your towel with you with “How are risks allocated?” printed on it;
  • manage the change process in a way that takes your fellow travellers with you – or at least have some idea of where you are going;
  • always apply the consistency theorem; and
  • remember consumers are at the centre of the universe, not waiting in a restaurant at the end of it.

Thank you.

AEMC Chairman address to regulators in Ontario, Canada - CAMPUT

08 May 2013

AEMC Chairman, John Pierce, has presented a conference paper and addressed the Canadian Association of Members of Public Utility Tribunals in Ontario, Canada. Mr Pierce was invited to present at their annual conference “Serving the Public Interest: The Regulator’s Balancing Act” (12.30am Wednesday 8 May 2013 AEST).

 

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