

Optional Firm Access –
Design and Testing
AEMC Public Forum
14 August 2014



- Introduction
- Overall impression of changes since TFR
- Firm Access Planning Standard
- Incentives
- Concerns / more detail required

- View OFA as a positive development if benefits can be demonstrated to exceed the (substantial) costs of implementation.
 - Need to know that the arrangements can be practically implemented
- Changes to the proposed Firm Access Standard and Incentives are seen as improvements in the model
- Still need more detail on some key aspects
 - LRIC pricing model, relationship between generator and TNSP under OFA, long-term inter-regional product

- GA considers the changes proposed in FAS and Incentives improve the workability of the model
 - Distinction between Normal Operating Conditions and Abnormal Operating Conditions is somewhat arbitrary
 - How to apply incentives under AOC when the FAS wouldn't apply?
 - Incentives paid through settlements could be exhausted during the year
 - Nested caps help this but are not a complete remedy

Firm Access Planning Standard

- AEMC expects the FAPS conditions “would be determined with reference to the expected occurrences of material constraints in a region”
 - This could be the conditions of minimum “headroom” in network capability
 - May be peak demand time, but not always
- GA supports the proposed flexibility in specifying the standard – able to adapt to different network topologies and generating systems

- AEMC has presented two options for Incentive Schemes
 - Option 1 – Target Shortfall Factor
 - Option 2 – Annual Shortfall Target
- Both options recognise that target flowgate capacity can't be provided at all times under all conditions
 - Option 1 – penalties / rewards settled progressively through the year through access settlements
 - Option 2 – penalties / rewards settled ex-post after the end of the year

- Penalties / Rewards reflect actual shortfall costs in each Trading Interval – up to the relevant cap
 - Analogous to liquidated damages but the cap is not calibrated to potential generator losses / gains
 - Caps are pooled across all generators so how is a penalty / reward shared when a cap is reached?
 - Annual cap can still be exhausted before the end of the year
 - How to resolve disputes / contentious events in time for settlements? Who would resolve disputes?

- Penalties / Rewards accumulate over the whole year – subject to relevant caps
 - Similar to existing STPIS
 - Annual settlement of penalty / reward can be distributed across all generators
 - Generator experiencing a shortfall event late in the year will still receive some payment, even if the annual cap has been reached
 - Sufficient time to resolve any disputes / contentions prior to distribution of penalties / rewards

- Grid Australia favours Option 2
 - Administratively simpler
 - Payments to / from generators don't depend on when a congestion event occurs (before or after a cap is reached)
 - Consistent with existing STPIS framework
 - Penalties / rewards should be viewed as operational incentives, not compensation

- What is the nature of the relationship between Generators and TNSPs under OFA?
 - How is the TNSP service commitment to the generator made an obligation?
 - How is the generator obligation to pay the TNSP for the Firm Access service made?
 - Appears to be a commitment to a regulatory standard / outcome rather than a bilateral contract for a service
 - Similar to the shared network service received by consumers
 - Clarity around this will inform how best to enforce the FAPS

Concerns / More Detail Required

- Not clear how an auction where only existing participants (by definition) can participate will reveal the value of long-lived investments
- Development of new / augmented interconnectors
 - How is the value of enhanced interconnector capacity to future, as yet unannounced or uncommitted, generators revealed / ascertained?
 - Can the demand-side, represented by Retailers, make sufficiently long-term commitments?