AEMC DSP 3 Review Public Forum

Incentives for DSP – a distributor's perspective

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Overview

- AEMC Directions Paper
- DSP's importance
- Preference for incentives
- Cost reflective pricing
 - Critical Peak Pricing
 Case Study



SP AusNet

AEMC Directions Paper

• SP AusNet supports the findings of the Directions Paper

- Encouraged by further consideration of:
 - options for appropriate commercial incentives for distribution businesses (DBs) towards DSP options
 - possible temporary arrangements which help DBs manage any additional risks
 - the potential for DBs to provide DSP products to consumers

DSP is increasingly important

SP AusNet Peak Demand Vs Annual Load

SP AusNet



We need alternatives to continued capital investment

Incentives work

• SP AusNet supports financial incentives over regulatory obligations and cost recovery

- Range of potential incentives:
 - higher-powered incentive scheme similar to the S-factor to reward efficient demand side response (demand reduction)
 - innovation and R&D rewards

A high power DSP incentive

- A high powered incentive scheme like S-factor:
 - based upon a value of reduced energy consumption
 - target based on net benefits achieved, energy or capacity saved
- Well-designed scheme would involve:
 - an appropriate measurable target
 - an adequate quantum of reward
 - the marginal incentive rate
 - caps or floors to mitigate the risks of the incentive

Incentive options

- Rewarding Innovation and R&D is key to driving DSP:
 - An "obligations-led" approach to regulation will hinder innovation and R&D
- Rewards of innovation and R&D are generally long term in nature:
 - Under building block regulation, rewards are truncated
- Ofgem has implemented Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) to address this issue:
 - IFI has yielded some positive results

Cost-reflective pricing

- Strongest driver of DSP will be a cost reflective price signal:
 - Gives consumers and potential investors the future cost of consumption
 - Provides a financial incentive for them to change their consumption and /or investment behaviour, if beneficial
- This allows the community to optimise its use of its current resources, therefore, maximising community welfare

• SP AusNet's critical peak pricing tariff as a case study

<160MWh (large LV, HV and Sub-transmission customers) Tariff **Approved Tariff** Component The demand charge based on the average of customer's maximum kVA recorded on the 5 nominated peak demand weekdays during the Defined Two Part Critical Peak Demand Period. **Demand Charge** Capacity Charge based on the **Capacity** of the connection assets Days must be in summer (+ March), and the days will be nominated and **Defined Critical** communicated to customers at least one day in advance. Peak Demand The period only includes between 2pm-6pm on that nominated day. The 5 maximum's are averaged and used as the basis for the demand charge Period for the next 12 months. **Energy Charge** Similar to existing charges Standing Charge Similar to existing charges

- 2011 summer period* saw a marked response to the critical peak tariff. Of 1,800 industrial customers:
 - 66% reduced their demand from the nominated value
 - Over 300 reduced their demand by more than 50%
 - Over 75 customers achieved reductions above 90%.

• This represented a net 88MW reduction in peak demand

* The 2011 Victorian summer was mild so caution must be taken before intimating all the observed demand reduction was due just to the new tariff.

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Customer without generation



SP AusNet

Customer with generation



Note Times are

Concluding remarks

- Price signals work
 - Retailers pass on the network price signals
 - Creating the right price signal creates a market product
 - If 'Time of Use' tariffs are rolled out for domestic and commercial customers, will this ignite the DSP market?
- Incentives work
 - Further work to develop scheme with suitable parameters