

Alinta Energy Limited – AEMC Reliability Panel Review of Reliability Settings Public Forum 12 February 2010

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- The Reliability Panel will leave 0.002% USE per annum for the NEM
- ROAM suggest a MPC from 2012/13 financial year of \$16,000/MWh (initial estimate was \$20,000MWh) and a CPT from 2012/13 of \$240,000 (initial estimate was \$300,000)
- The CPT is left at 15 times the MPC, and nature of relationship with MPC not fully explored by the panel
- The ROAM modelling has some improvements over the previous CRA modelling; for example, CRA assumed the interconnectors were always at full capacity, while the ROAM modelling does not make this assumption
- The Reliability Panel acknowledges that there are other factors to consider, and this leaves it open for submissions
- The process:
 - Submissions due by the 23 February 2010;
 - Final report is released by the end of April;
 - the AEMC then takes the Reliability Panel's recommendations & examines other factors and makes a decision.

Investing to achieve reliability



- In simple terms the reliability framework operates as follows:
 - AEMO measures on an ongoing basis, and identifies the existence of supply and demand balance using the unserved energy (USE) standard of 0.002%
 - At USE 0.002%: it identifies potential MW gaps on a NEM region basis
 - The value of the imbalance is driven by MPC and CPT to a lesser extent
 - For a retailer the value at risk is driven by volume (contracted load) by expected price or MPC
- A type 1 error of the Reliability Setting would be:
 - The USE identifies a shortfall at 0.002%
 - But MPC is too low and does not incentivise investment in supply or demand side response
- A type 2 error in the Reliability Setting would be:
 - The USE identifies a shortfall at 0.002%
 - And MPC is too high and results in incentivising more investment in supply or demand side response than needed
- Alinta considers that on balance the reliability framework should be set in such a way that it reduces the risk of a type 1 errors
- Critically, Alinta considers that the key is MPC being set to encourage actually physical investment in new supply or permanent load reduction incentives to invest

Investing to achieve reliability - incentives



- The USE represents an informational signal to market participants it is the catalyst for incentives within the market
- MPC represents the essential component that allows the estimation or forecasting of expected value at risk from USE risk
- Determining USE and MPC impacts on incentives is difficult and problematic illustrated by ROAM Modelling assumptions & identified limitations associated with the modelling
- Accordingly, if USE measurement considered the appropriate 'technical' test then the setting of MPC should be largely based on observable market data such as:
 - What are capital costs for available generator technology?
 - And what is an economic rate of return on invested capital taking into the account the risks of the investment



- RP (and ROAM) focus on in setting a 'balanced' MPC having regard to:
 - Forecast capital costs of the marginal generator with least capital cost & proven technology an Open Cycle Gas Turbine
 - The expected rate of return on capital as this represents the key capital market considerations for investment
- Capital costs are increasing (or have increased):
 - 2009 forecast compared to 2007 forecasts for capital costs for OCGT show a 30% increase, which is \$55 million difference for a 240MW power station
 - Moreover, for the next 5 years the majority of market participants are forecasting above CPI price escalation across the key input commodities used to produce OCGTs
- Money is more expensive:
 - Historic rates of return on capital for the power sector lie between 9% 10%
 - Recent GFC has increased spreads between risk free rate and paper for corporate and project finance from 1% up to 6% - every 1% increase in required rate of return on capital increase O & M costs by \$2.4 million per annum for a 240MW OCGT
 - Recent GFC has meant that there are less market participants in the finance industry that invest in power stations

A too high MPC / CPT Setting – implications



- If the MPC is set too high there are implications
 - Transmission congestion in transmission congested networks, a constrained generator may loose the opportunity to supply ad much energy as bid (potentially removing the MPC event) or may loose real money as a result of having to buy energy at the time of the MPC event to cover a contract
 - Small Retailer risk risk management practices would need to reflect the greater potential for value loss with the higher MPC, thinly capitalised retailer may go out of business – which potentially may lessen competition
 - Retail price cap regulation apart from Victoria, there is a delay in cost recovery for retailers from any increase in the MPC which flows through energy costs
 - Generator delivery risks OTC contracts not offered or risk premium too high
- The majority of these 'risks', apart from transmission congestion, are able to be hedged or risk managed albeit at a cost (how efficient this cost is a matter of debate)
- The Reliability Panel's role is to consider the MPC and whether MPC is adequate to encourage investment to achieve USE
- MPC's impact on market dynamics, including transmission congestion, small retailer risks etc, is a matter for the full AEMC confusing the issues is problematic

Concluding remarks



- USE at 0.002% support
- Ensuring it is achieved on a NEM region basis on a 10 year rolling average support
- MPC at \$16,000/MWh commencing in 2012/13 support
 - Higher capital costs now for OCGT (30% increase between 2007 2009 ACIL Tasman forecasts)
 - Higher required rates of return on capital (GFC driven increase from 1% spread up to 6% spread ->\$50M every 1% increase)
- CPT at \$240,000 commencing in 2012/13 support subject to a further review designed to examine aggregate market risk of prudential failure caused by higher MPC/CPT
- Reliability Panel's role is to examine the reliability settings the impact that changing these setting may have on other market design matters is something for the AEMC to consider along with the Reliability Panel's recommendations