

## 2022 Review of the guidelines for identifying reviewable operating incidents draft report

### The Reliability Panel has published its draft report for the 2022 review of the guidelines for identifying reviewable operating incidents

The Reliability Panel (The Panel) is responsible for publishing the guidelines for identifying reviewable operating incidents (the guidelines) that are used by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) to determine when a power system security incident is considered a 'reviewable operating incident'. Reviewable operating incidents are unusual or 'significant' events on the power system that impact system security, which AEMO is required to investigate and publicly report on under the National Electricity Rules (NER).<sup>1</sup> The Panel considers the overarching objective of reviewing operating incidents is to promote the secure operation of the power system. The guidelines promote this objective by making sure incidents of significance to power system security are within the scope of what is considered 'reviewable' by AEMO. These guidelines also provide additional clarity and certainty on the review requirement, working to ensure AEMO does not undertake unnecessary reviews.

On 25 March 2022, AEMO sent a letter to the Chair of the Reliability Panel proposing five changes to the guidelines. The Panel commenced a review of the guidelines as it considered AEMO's proposals were justified for further consideration and that it was timely to update the guidelines given the transition underway.

### In the draft report the Panel proposes to accept the majority of AEMO's proposed changes, and is seeking stakeholder feedback on other amendments to the guidelines

The Panel proposes to make a number of amendments to the guidelines, considering that these would, or are likely to, better contribute to achieving the National Electricity Objective (NEO) and improve the efficiency of the guidelines.

First, the Panel proposes to amend the guidelines to reflect the first four of AEMO's changes as it considers they would generally increase the efficiency of the guidelines and ensure only necessary reviews are undertaken and participant costs are minimised. The Panel proposes to:

- exclude non-credible contingency events where successful auto-reclose occurred and where no other power system security issues are identified
- exclude events where a transmission line trips at one end only, or a single circuit breaker trips and where no other power system security issues are identified
- remove reference to embedded generating units, to clarify and provide discretion for AEMO to review events relating to the simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) trip of multiple generating units
- confirm that AEMO is not required to report on incidents involving the correct or normal operation of under-frequency control schemes where only contracted load blocks are tripped

Second, to address recent changes to Queensland System Restart Ancillary Services (SRAS) subnetworks, the Panel proposes to amend the boundaries for north, central, and south Queensland regions for the purposes of AEMO's reporting on major supply

<sup>1</sup> NER Clause 4.8.15(a)(3).

interruptions constituting a 'reviewable operating event'.<sup>2</sup>

The Panel has also identified several areas where additional stakeholder feedback is required prior to it making a specific recommendation. These areas are:

- AEMO's proposal to limit reporting in respect of non-secure or non-satisfactory operation of the power system to only where critical transmission elements are impacted or affected. Stakeholder feedback on the materiality and potential impact of the change is sought to inform the Panel's final decision whether this change is made.
- whether an additional reviewable operating incident trigger should be included to cover the power system security impact of sudden and unexpected changes in power flows which constitute a contingency event under the *Enhancing operational resilience in relation to indistinct events* rule.<sup>3</sup>The Panel is seeking stakeholder feedback through the draft report to inform its consideration on whether a new trigger is required or whether the system security impacts associated with sudden and unexpected changes in power flows are sufficiently addressed under existing triggers.

### Reviewable operating incident reports are a key indicator of power system security performance of the National Electricity Market (NEM), with the guidelines helping AEMO to identify incidents on the power system that require reporting

AEMO's reporting on reviewable operating incidents allows it to assess the adequacy of the provision and response of facilities or services, and the appropriateness of actions taken to restore or maintain power system security. These reports provide highly valuable information to policy-makers, market bodies, market participants, jurisdictions, and the Panel to understand system security risks in the NEM.

The Panel, therefore, considers the overarching objective of reviewing operating incidents is to promote the secure operation of the power system. It also provides additional guidance for AEMO on what kind of incidents it should review to promote the secure operation of the power system while avoiding unnecessary costs.

### Review timelines and consultation

The Panel will consider the views of stakeholders on the proposed changes to the guidelines, prior to making any final recommendations in the final report. The Reliability Panel is seeking stakeholder input on its draft report with submissions due by **COB Thursday 28 July 2022**.

Due to complexities arising from the indistinct events rule and changes to the Queensland SRAS sub-networks, the Panel's review of the guidelines has been extended by 4 weeks to provide time to seek feedback from AEMO and form final positions on these issues. The indicative timeline for consultation and publishing of the final report can be found below.

**Table 1: Indicative review timetable**

TIMELINE	DATE
Draft report and guidelines published	30 June 2022
Stakeholder submission close	28 July 2022
Final report published	29 September 2022

<sup>2</sup> The existing guideline references to north, central, and south Queensland regions refer to the system restart ancillary service (SRAS) sub-networks that existed in 2012 when the guideline was last reviewed. As these sub-networks have since been amalgamated, the Panel proposes to adopt the original north, central and south QLD sub-network boundaries in an addendum to the guidelines to ensure AEMO continues to report on major load interruptions in either part of the state.

<sup>3</sup> AEMC, *Enhancing operational resilience in relation to indistinct events*, final determination, 3 March 2022, available [here](#).

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